VIRTUAL MARKETS FOR VIRTUAL GOODS:
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Peter Eckersley†
ABSTRACT:
The Internet and Copyright Law are particularly ill-suited to each other. One is designed
to give as much information as possible to everyone who wants it; the other allows authors,
artists and publishers to earn money by restricting the distribution of works made out of
information. The beneficiaries of copyright law are lobbying for the re-design of computers and
the Internet to instate “content control” and “digital rights management” (DRM). These
technologies are intended to make copyright workable again by re-imposing limits on access to
information goods, but they carry high direct and indirect social costs.
One alternative, which has generally received much less attention and legislative support
than DRM, is to allow free distribution of works for non-commercial use, while restructuring
digital copyright law so as to remunerate authors in ways which avoid those exclusive rights
models which are incompatible with the Internet. This paper introduces the concept of a “virtual
market” — a decentralized, software-mediated, publicly-funded mechanism which rewards
digital authorship and artistry, without restricting flows of information. The virtual market is a
sort of “mirror image” of a real marketplace, assigning market-like valuations to works, without
an actual process of exchange. The normative economic implications of these systems are
considered in detail, along with some of the technological requirements and other practical
aspects of their implementation.
This article concludes that virtual markets avoid the very high artificial scarcity
(“deadweight loss”) and infrastructure costs associated with DRM, and should be seriously
considered as a public policy alternative to strengthening copyright law. Furthermore, while
there is already a robust case for such alternative compensation systems for musical works, the
nature of text and of DRM technology mean that, in time, the need for alternatives to exclusive
rights will be even greater for written works.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Information Anarchism and Information Feudalism
It is now well established that the relationship between the Internet and Copyright Law is
problematic. The rise and fall of Napster,1 its replacement by numerous second- and thirdgeneration file sharing networks,2 and conflicts over the technological enforcement of
restrictions on access to and reproduction of works, collectively form an ongoing crisis for
copyright.
The problems of property privileges in digital information goods have been recognized
clearly at least since John Perry Barlow's 1994 essay “The Economy of Ideas'”.3 They have been
the subject of extensive study, debate, and hypothesization. The core difficulty remains that it is
simply very ambitious to try to limit the distribution of a thing, when that thing can be
reproduced by almost anyone, across great distances, with perfect fidelity, and at little or no cost.
While the newly accessible universe of works in digital form presents a tremendous boon to
consumers, it strikes right at the heart of the institutions which capitalist societies use to fund the
production of culture.
There appear to be two principal schools of thought on digital copyright, both of which
were present in Barlow's original essay. The first, which I shall call “information anarchism”,
1

See Napster v. A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
A number of these systems are organized specifically to share music or other multimedia files; others are
generalized, multi-purpose information distribution systems. Successive examples, some of which have themselves
proved vulnerable to lawsuits from the music industry, include Aimster (see in re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir.
2003)), AudioGalaxy (see Kennon Ballou, RIP Audiogalaxy, KURO5HIN, Jun. 21, 2002, at
http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2002/6/21/171321/675), FastTrack (with clients initially including Grokster, KaZaa,
and Morpheus), eDonkey2000, Gnutella, Circle, Chord (see Ion Stoica et al., Chord: A Scalable Peer-To-Peer
Lookup Service for Internet Applications, in PROC. 2001 ACM SIGCOMM CONFERENCE, 149 (2001),
http://pdos.lcs.mit.edu/papers/chord:sigcomm01/chord_sigcomm.pdf), and Freenet (see I. Clarke et al., Freenet: A
Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System, in H. Federrath, ed., PROC. ICSI WORKSHOP ON
DESIGN ISSUES IN ANONYMITY AND UNOBSERVABILITY (2001), http://freenetproject.org/index.php?page=icsirevised). The extent to which each network is susceptible to litigation depends upon the degree of centralization in
both the network's architecture and the management of its development; see, e.g., Mathias Strasser, Beyond Napster:
How the Law Might Respond to a Changing Internet Architecture, 28 N. KENTUCKY L.J. 660 (2001). The extent to
which they are susceptible to regulation enforced by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) depends on the number of
non-infringing uses for their protocols, and the extent to which the protocols make the actions of participants visible.
3
See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A framework for rethinking patents and copyrights in the digital
age WIRED MAG. March 1994, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas_pr.html. This is not to say
that Barlow was the first to recognize the profound implications of digital technology for copyright law; see, e.g.,
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 119–25 (1967). The importance of Barlow's contribution
was a combination of broad perspective, prescient analysis, and accessibility; his work not only accurately identified
many aspects of the problem, but also catalyzed significant debate.
2
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advocates the abolition or at least dilution of copyright on the Internet, and claims that the
production of music and writing would not be seriously affected. Most information anarchists
claim that the death of the copyright system is desirable, inevitable, or both.4
Barlow's essay also explored the other side of the current debate, through his description
of an approach called “crypto bottling”. That idea has now evolved into Digital Rights
Management (DRM),5 which is generally advocated by publishing industries. DRM seeks to
reinstate copyright in the online environment by using cryptography and ubiquitous “trusted
systems”6 to control the use of information in consumers' homes — and most everywhere else.7
The most enthusiastic DRM advocates also regularly argue that there is little or no
difference between copyright and material property rights.8 Because of the nature of networked
computers, anything less than an absolute dominion of exclusive rights will provide loopholes
for the public to abscond with precious digital goods.
At a practical level, attempts to create real-world DRM systems have involved not only

4

For some noteworthy examples of these perspectives, see Brian Martin, Against Intellectual Property, 21 PHIL. &
SOC. ACTION 7 (1995), http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/95psa.html; Eben Moglen, Anarchism
Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright FIRST MONDAY Aug. 1999, at
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4_8/moglen/; John Perry Barlow, The Next Economy of Ideas WIRED MAG.
Oct. 2000, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.10/download.html; Courtney Love, Courtney Love does the math
SALON Jun. 2000, at http://dir.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/06/14/love/index.html. Compare Stephen Breyer, The
Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 281 (1970); Mark S. Nadel, Questioning the Economic Justification for (and thus the Constitutionality of)
Copyright Law's Prohibition Against Unauthorized Copying: § 106, AEI-Brookings Join Center, Related
Publication 03-1, Jan. 2003, http://www.aei.brookings.org/admin/pdffiles/Nadel.pdf.
5
Also commonly known as “technical protection measures”, or “digital restrictions management”, by some of its
more vocal critics — see http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/words-to-avoid.html#DigitalRightsManagement (since Jul.
2002). DRM can be used to refer to a broad family of technologies, linked more by similar goals than by technical
details. While this threatens to render the term ambiguous, it appears that if DRM is to be truly effective at making
copying hard, it will have to adopt distinctive features; see infra III.C.2.
6
A trusted system is a computer which is sold to a consumer, and used to view information, but which remains, on
some key level, under the control of information publishers.
7
The literature advocating DRM is extensive. A frequently cited early work is PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S
HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX Chapter 6 (1994), although it failed to anticipate the
fraught nature of digital copyright. Stefik has presented a more thorough overview of many aspects of the DRM
project, along with a normative argument in favor of it; see Mark Stefik, Shifting The Possible: How Trusted
Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us To Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137
(1997), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/vol12/Stefik/html/reader.html (proposing a DRM
architecture based on trusted systems); Mark Stefik and Alex Silverman, The Bit and the Pendulum: Balancing the
Interests of Stakeholders in Digital Publishing, 18 AM. PROGRAMMER 18 (1997) (arguing that DRM will be adopted
if, and only if, it makes both information producers and consumers better off compared to some ex ante baseline).
8
This claim is repeatedly asserted or implied by the representatives of copyright industry trade associations, who
claim that copyright infringement is “theft” or “stealing”. But it also has some defenders within academe; see, e.g.,
Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace versus Property Law?, 4 TEXAS REV. L. & POL. 103 (1999); Edmund W. Kitch,
Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727 (2000),
http://law.vanderbilt.edu/lawreview/vol536/kitch.pdf. From economic and ethical perspectives, this argument is
potentially confusing, because material objects are affected by property rights in ways that are sharply distinct from
the effect of copyrights or patents on non-rivalrous cultural and inventive goods.
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the deployment of technologies to prevent the reproduction of digital media objects, but also the
expansion of copyright through the enactment of legislation to ensure that DRM is sanctioned
and reinforced by law.9 A larger political program, of which this is a central part, is seen by its
critics as threatening to create a dystopian society of “information feudalism”.10
Fears about overreaching copyright and the negative consequences of DRM — whether
subtle or dystopian — have combined with the allure of a cornucopia of unfettered digital
knowledge, to quicken the information anarchist movement. The most important questions raised
by this movement are whether a world without copyright would in fact drive writers and artists
further into penury, or perhaps hamper the production of great cinema. There has been no
shortage of radical, grassroots suggestions attempting to answer these concerns and suggest ways
that authors might make money in such a world,11 and information anarchism has had some

9

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999); World Intellectual Property Organization: Copyright Treaty, December 20,
1996, art. 11–12; European Parliament & Council Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, art. 6–7, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10; Australian Copyright
Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000, Schedule 1, Division 2A.
10
See, e.g., Peter Drahos, Information Feudalism in the Information Society THE INFO. SOC'Y (1995),
http://slash.autonomedia.org/print.pl?sid=02/07/30/2024235; PETER DRAHOS AND JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002); Richard M. Stallman, The Right to
Read COMM. ACM 85 February 1997, http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/right-to-read.html; Martin Kretschmer,
Feudalism, Retreat or Revolution?, in PROC. SYMPOSIUM ON A NEW FEUDALISM OF IDEAS (2001),
http://www.cippm.org.uk/pdfs/martin.pdf (works emphasizing the “feudalistic” aspects of modern copyright).
Stallman has also famously argued that we are likely to see a “War on Copying” reminiscent of the “War on
Drugs”; see Richard M. Stallman, Free Software and Beyond, Presented at Wizards of OS: Operating Systems and
Social Systems, Berlin, (1999), at http://mikro.org/Events/OS/ref-texte/stallman.html. Within the United States,
information feudalist legislative proposals which have sparked a number of dystopian critiques include the
SSSCA/CBDTPA (see Jeff Bowers, The CBDTPA is Immune to (Conventional) Criticism, (2002), at
http://www.jerf.org/writings/CBDTPA.html); H.R. 5211, the Berman “peer-to-peer hacking bill” (see Michelle
Delio,
The
Dark
Side
of
Hacking
Bill
WIRED
NEWS
Jul.
27,
2002,
at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,54153,00.html); the INDUCE Act/S. 2560 (see James Grimmelmann,
The LawMeme Reader's Guide to Ernie Miller's Guide to the INDUCE Act, LawMeme, Jul. 14, 2004, at
http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1549) and state laws based on the
Motion Picture Association of America's original “Model Communications Security Legislation”; see, e.g., Aaron
Swartz, letter to Illinois State legislators (Apr. 21, 2003) http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/000901.
11
A few examples include Clarke's “fairshare” system; see Ian Clarke, Fairshare - Rewarding artists without
Copyright, (2001), http://freenetproject.org/index.php?page=fairshare; variants of what Kelsey and Schneier call the
“street performer protocol” (SPP); see Breyer, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 302–6; John Kelsey
and Bruce Schneier, The Street Performer Protocol and Digital Copyright FIRST MONDAY Jun. 1999, at
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4_6/kelsey/; Dianne L. Zimmerman, Authorship Without Ownership:
Reconsidering Incentives in a Digital Age, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1121 (2003) (examining parallels between SPP and
the economy of print publishing in 19th century Britain); Chris Rasch, The Wall Street Performer Protocol: Using
Software Completion Bonds to Fund Open Source Software Development FIRST MONDAY Jun. 2001, at
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue6_6/rasch/ (extending Kelsey and Schneier's proposal to software
development);
Paul
Harrison,
The
Rational
Street
Performer
Protocol,
(2002),
at
http://yoyo.cc.monash.edu.au/~pfh/rational.html; and gift economies (see, e.g., Jim Carrico, Potlatch Protocol draft
proposal 0.1, (2001), at http://www.potlatch.net/protocol.01.html), coupled with micropayment systems; see, e.g.,
http://www.musiclink.com. See also http://www.infoanarchy.org (an information anarchist news site).
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isolated successes.12 But the models which information anarchists propose remain largely
theoretical, and often assume that social norms can be harnessed to prevent free riding by
information users.13 Unless these models begin to achieve widespread bottom-up success, it is
unlikely that information anarchism will be taken seriously by policymakers.
There has been a fierce, if asymmetrical struggle between the two polar views of digital
copyright. Copyright expansionists have to a great extent succeeded in rewriting national and
international law books to support their cause,14 but exclusive rights remain difficult to enforce
by either technological or legal means. Info-liberationists, who wish to see the role of copyright
reduced, removed or recast — or who simply want to watch their DVDs using free software —
have had little trouble poking holes in deployed DRM systems,15 and file sharing networks are,
for the time being, escaping closure.16
In the music industry, while effective technical protection measures have proved elusive,
the use of direct enforcement, and the availability of pay-for-download services, have decreased
the extent of file sharing. But it is not clear whether this trend can go further, or whether it is
12

One example is Stephen King, who collected over USD $700,000 in tips from a few chapters of his book The
Plant; see Stephen King, The Plant Income/Expense Report Through 12/31/00, (2001), at
http://www.stephenking.com/sk_120400_2.html. It was widely reported that his experiment had failed (see N.Y.
TIMES King Closure, Editorial, Dec. 1, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/01/opinion/01FRI3.html), although
King himself did not appear to take this point of view; see Stephen King, The Plant: Getting a Little Goofy, (2000),
at http://www.stephenking.com/sk_120400_2.html. Other examples include the fundraising efforts of kuro5hin.org,
a collaborative media site (see Rusty Foster, The fundraiser ends, and the next stage begins, KURO5HIN, Jun. 21,
2002, at http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2002/6/21/10533/6651); Blender, a 3D modeling and animation package
(see http://www.blender3d.org/Foundation/?sub=History (2003)), and Linux Weekly News; see
http://www.lwn.net/Articles/5838/ (Jul. 26, 2003). A recurring factor in all of these cases is that the donations have a
strong element of contingency, and thus appear to have a great deal in common with the SPP. See also Google's
“Google Answers” (http://answers.google.com) service, which is currently the largest operating example of a Wall
Street Performer Protocol-like system.
13
This criticism is only partially true of the Street Performer Protocol and its variants, which take significant steps to
reduce, if not eliminate, the free rider problem. For an indication of why SPP variants are unlikely to be
economically (Pareto) optimal, at least for non-discrete goods, see the modeling of strategies for Lindahl voting
games in RICHARD CORNES AND TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB
GOODS 215–7 (second edition 1996). Despite such imperfections, the street performer protocol deserves much more
scholarly attention than it has received to date.
14
For accounts of the process by which intellectual property laws are set, see JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT
(2001); JOHN BRAITHWAITE AND PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION Chapter 7 (2000); Drahos &
Braithwaite, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. See also James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property:
Environmentalism
for
the
Net?,
47
DUKE
L.J.
87
(1997),
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dlj/articles/dlj47p87.htm (explaining why proprietarian interests have
overwhelmed “public interest” perspectives in these contests). Despite the very substantial expansion of copyright
in the 1990s, there have been some important limits to copyright industries' legislative and legal victories —
deriving both from the need to negotiate developments with the telecommunications and consumer electronics
industries, and from the complexities of directing the force of law at widespread behavior by the public; see infra
note 31.
15
In fact, serious questions remain as to whether secure DRM is a real possibility; see infra § III.C.2.
16
See MGM v. Grokster http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/20040819_mgm_v_grokster_decision.pdf
(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the Betamax defense is applicable to decentralized file sharing networks).
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even permanent17 — and music sales are slowly declining.18 Paid-download schemes are
attracting some users,19 but profits have yet to become apparent,20 and this relatively small
fraction of consumption is unlikely to increase in the face of competition from free alternatives.
The situation in other “literary and artistic” copyright industries varies. Despite the
protestations of the Motion Picture Association of America, the film industry is relatively safe;
while the burning of DVDs might result in peripheral revenue reductions, the cinema is a secure
institution, and the bandwidth requirements of sharing films will remain exorbitant for some time
to come. But the supply of professionally-staffed and well-resourced web sites is certainly
limited by the absence of robust, direct revenue sources. And at some point, the authors and
publishers of books will face a crisis to make the current predicament of the major record labels
look positively cozy.21
The status quo, if one can be said to exist, is a situation of instability. Whatever the real
extent and urgency of the threat to the viability of “content industries”, the normative and logical
basis of copyright law is seriously inconsistent with the limited and non-uniform reality of
copyright as a regulatory mechanism for the Internet. This inconsistency continues to be the
cause of a great deal of friction and dispute, wasted resources and wasted opportunities. The
predominant analyses — those of information anarchism and feudalism — appear to be flawed,
each failing to satisfactorily address questions about the way that the economy of digital culture
should be fairly regulated, and how to get there.
Against this backdrop, there have been many attempts to take an objective view of the
copyright crisis, and to find ways out of the prevalent ideological impasse.22 Often, the work in
17

See Alex Veiga, Report: Illegal Music Downloading Climbs, Associate Press, Jan. 15, 2004, available at
http://customwire.ap.org/dynamic/stories/M/MUSIC_DOWNLOADING?SITE=MIDTF.
18
See Stan J. Liebowitz, Will MP3 Downloads Eliminate the Record Industry? The Evidence So Far, in ADVANCES
IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND GROWTH. (Gary Libecap, ed.2003).
19
See Tony Smith, Napster song sales hit 5m, The Register, Feb. 25, 2004, at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/35777.html (reporting 5 million paid downloads for Roxio's Napster and 25
million for Apple's iTunes Music Store, to December 2003).
20
See, e.g., Susie Harwood, Napster nets $15m relaunch loss, NETIMPERATIVE, Feb. 5, 2004, at
http://www.netimperative.com/cmn/viewdoc.jsp?cat=all&docid=BEP1_News_0000062055.
21
See infra nn 93–95 and accompanying text.
22
For an early attempt in this direction, see THEODOR H. NELSON, LITERARY MACHINES (1982/1993) (introducing
the concept of “transcopyright”). More recent examples include the US National Research Council's “digital
dilemma” report; see The Digital Dilemma: Intellectual Property in the Information Age, (2000),
http://books.nap.edu/html/digital_dilemma/ (attempting to take an objective view of the crisis); laudable but
potentially impractical arguments for DRM systems which respect the flexibility and numerous exceptions of
existing copyright systems; see Dan L. Burk and Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Copyright Management
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41 (2001); Richard Owens, Digital Rights Management (DRM): A Look Ahead, 7
INT. INTELL. PROP. L. & POL'Y (2001); or claims that copyright laws and copyright norms can evolve to reach a
sustainable, balanced equilibrium in digital environments see, e.g., Christopher Jensen, The More Things Change,
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this direction succeeds only in emphasizing the intractability of the problem. This seems to be
particularly true of approaches which seek to find more balanced digital arrangements of those
same kinds of exclusive rights which have traditionally constituted literary and artistic property.

B. Virtual Markets for Virtual Goods
It may be that in order to find coherent middle ground between information anarchism
and information feudalism, it is necessary step away from the metaphor of property rights and
into the territory of “compensation without control”,23 at least with regards to noncommercial
copying. While digital technology is rendering the economics of exclusive rights unstable, it is
simultaneously opening dramatic and novel possibilities for alternatives.
This paper explores one such class of alternative compensation systems, which are
publicly funded and not dependent on a strong central notion of “property”. These systems
would create “virtual markets” to provide incentives for information production, in much the
same way that an actual marketplace provides incentives for the manufacture of physical
goods.24 At the same time, they would allow universal noncommercial access to information
goods, avoiding the deadweight loss and high overheads of DRM exclusion systems. For
convenience, I adopt the acronym “VMRS” to refer to virtual market reward/remuneration
systems.
By virtue of their technical architecture, these virtual markets could be decentralized,
efficient and in some sense “democratic”25— the very qualities of successfully operating
markets, which lead so many observers to favor them. Within the proposal, there is a crucial role
for government — the use of taxation to solve the underlying free-rider problem; but the design
of the system ensures that the government has little or no control over the way that these funds
are distributed — that role is devolved to the end-users and cyber-citizenry who pay for and
should benefit from the scheme.
the More They Stay the Same: Copyright, Digital Technology, and Social Norms, 56 STAN. L. REV. 531 (2003);
Henning Wiese, The Justification of the Copyright System in the Digital Age, 24 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 387
(2002).
23
The terminology is Lessig's; see LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 201 (2001), though he has no veto over
the way I develop the idea here.
24
The choice of the term “virtual” is discussed further below — see infra § II.B.
25
Whether and how markets are actually democratic is a complicated question, and as much a matter of definition
and context as a matter of fact. Clearly, there are differences in the way that these institutions aggregate preferences
(see, e.g., GEOFFREY BRENNAN AND ALAN HAMLIN, DEMOCRATIC DEVICES AND DESIRES 83–4, Theories of
Institutional Design. (2000) ); the market may disenfranchise more participants than the ballot box, and give
disproportionate power to fortunate individuals, but it can also provide a greater channel for the expression of the
intensity of preferences.
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The idea which this paper develops is not entirely unprecedented. Section II begins by
discussing some of the antecedents, in theory and practice, for the model proposed here. These
include the recent and growing literature on alternative compensation systems, to which this
article belongs,26 as well as older explorations of rewards as alternatives to patents,27 and the
more limited semi-centralized remuneration schemes which currently form a part of some
countries' copyright systems — private copying levies,28 and lending rights for public libraries.29
Historically, there have been many practical limitations on the operation of publicly
funded remuneration mechanisms, stemming chiefly from the need to decide who gets how much
from the system. Section II.B sets out how cheap and ubiquitous computing devices could be
used to overcome this problem — to collect enough information, with enough fidelity, that it
becomes possible to replace copyright marketplaces with reward-based “virtual” marketplaces.
Section III attempts a normative comparison of virtual markets and digital rights
management as alternative institutions for preventing free-riding and financing cultural
production. In Sections III.A and III.B, the literature on the economic analysis of copyright is
briefly reviewed, and consideration is given as to particular problems of modeling digital
copyright. I show that there are a number of important factors which limit analytic comparisons,
but identify future strategies for creating detailed models to circumvent these problems. Section
III.C then presents a structured, semi-analytic argument which weighs the various economic
factors which may favor DRM or virtual markets, and demonstrates that there are some very
strong reasons for the adoption of VMRS.
Section IV surveys some of the issues which would arise if an attempt were made to
implement a virtual market, both inevitably and as a result of interactions with existing laws.
Section V concludes by addressing some common outstanding responses to the idea of virtual
markets, commenting on the political circumstances that might make them plausible.

26

See infra note 49. The novel contributions which I have endeavored to add include an emphasis on technological
solutions for allocating funding; the structure of an economic comparison between DRM and decentralized
“alternative compensation system”, and further examination the numerous requirements and implications of public
funding as an alternative to exclusive rights.
27
See infra § II.A.1.
28
See infra nn 51–53 and accompanying text.
29
See infra note 50 and accompanying text. Conceptually, the humble public library, in particular, may suggest a
starting point for an efficient and non-obvious model for the infrastructure of a mature information economy. The
noble, egalitarian, and highly effective principles which motivate the creation of libraries — access to as much
knowledge and culture as possible, for as many people as possible — might also make very prudent cornerstones for
Internet regulation. In many countries, public lending rights schemes reward authors and publishers for their
(perhaps inadvertently) making libraries possible in the first place; the same principle is a key motivation for this
article.
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The methodology of this paper is deliberately multi-disciplinary. The normative position
it advocates has been motivated by an examination of the problem of digital copyright using a
combination of computer science and economic reasoning. Consideration of the existing
structure of copyright law is used both for comparative purposes, and for constructing policy
proposals in terms which are as incremental as possible.
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II.REWARD SYSTEMS
A. Rewards and Information Production
Copyright and patent laws, and related sui generis regimes, operate primarily on the basis
of exclusive rights. These are privileges, granted by society to the creator of a work (or the
corporation to whom they assign them), conveying the legal power to forbid people from doing
certain things with that work. Commerce has its ways and means, and these powers are often
used to demand payment in exchange for access or usage, rather than to prevent such acts
completely.
Exclusive rights also lie at the heart of the digital copyright crisis, because the Internet,
with its combination of decentralization and universality,30 its autonomous computers and subnetworks, has made the task of enforcing such privileges nearly impossible. When enforcement
is possible, it requires costly infrastructure, and, as many observers have remarked, it requires
direct enforcement of copyright law against the public at large, as opposed to enforcement
against commercial “pirates”.31 Instead of simply adding a few extra dollars in royalties to the
cost of a book or a record, copyright can now cause massive friction for information economies,
and serious inconveniences for individual information users.
One significant alternative to exclusive rights for information producers is a system of
rewards, whereby authors, artists or inventors are paid from the public purse for the service they
30

The term universality is used here in two senses. The more obvious is that the Internet provides a basis for nearubiquitous standards of data exchange. The other sense is that of computational universality (also known as “Turing
completeness”), the property of computers which means that they are all capable of performing the same kinds of
operations. If any information is accessible to a general-purpose computer, then, time and space permitting, that
computer will be capable of reproducing it.
31
For discussions of the implications of this state of affairs, see, e.g., Richard M. Stallman, Reevaluating Copyright:
The Public Must Prevail, 75 OR. L. REV. (1996), http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/reevaluating-copyright.html;
Litman, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; Jane C. Ginsburg, Can Copyright Become User-Friendly?
Review of Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright, 25 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 71 (2002),
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=288240. The fact that mass copyright infringement is now performed as
much by ordinary people as it is by professional “pirates”, and that copyright enforcement requires regulation of the
private sphere, has also been the root cause of some of the entertainment industry's defeats in the courts; see MGM
v. Grokster http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/20040819_mgm_v_grokster_decision.pdf (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that existing copyright statutes do not grant rights holders the power to shut down or regulate decentralized
file sharing networks with substantial non-infringing uses, even though many individuals use those networks to
infringe copyright); Recording Industry Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., Nos. 03-7015 & 03-7053,
2003 WL 22970995 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 19, 2003) http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200312/037015a.pdf, appeal filed (holding that the “notice and takedown” provisions in 17 U.S.C. § 512 do not extend to
requiring ISPs to disclose the identity of their subscribers in cases where they simply act as a conduit for end-to-end
protocols).
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have rendered to society. Such an idea might seem quaintly anachronistic to modern sensibility,
but it may take on particular importance if we conclude that there is something fundamentally
dysfunctional about exclusive rights enforced by DRM.
The efficacy of rewards depends greatly, however, on the nature of the information
produced and on the organization of the reward mechanism.

1. Rewards for Inventions
The concept of granting rewards as incentives for the production of information goods is
not new; it has been discussed as an alternative to exclusive patent rights for centuries.32 In 1660,
a utopian essay (probably written by the prominent scientist and patent skeptic Robert Hooke33)
described in some detail a fantastic society which benefited enormously from organizing public
rewards for valuable inventions.34 The idea was not purely utopian; MacLeod gives examples of
inventions for which retrospective rewards were provided,35 while Wright points out two
significant inventions which were prompted by “bounty” rewards.36 Robert Macfie, a British MP
and free trade advocate, agitated for an organized reward infrastructure during the mid-to-late
19th century,37 but the schemes of Macfie and his fellow travelers were defeated by an inconstant
zeitgeist.38
During the Second World War, Michael Polanvyi, who appears to have been aware of the
free trade movement's antipathy toward patents (but not Macfie's work on developing
alternatives), constructed a more extensive version of the argument for rewards.39 Since then,
economic analyses which address the question have periodically concluded that the case for the
patent system is not clear, and that either publicly contracted research, or taxation-funded
32

see CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1660-1800
Chapter 10 (1988) (a historical treatment of ideas about both patents and reward-based alternatives in England
before 1800).
33
Robert Hooke (1635–1703) is remembered today for the discovering the Newtonian mechanics of springs, for his
observation that plants were made from microscopic structures, which he termed “cells”, and for significant
inventive contributions to microscopy, telescopy, clockwork, and mechanical engineering.
34
The work is described by Macleod, MacLeod, supra note 32, at 191. It was constructed as an extension of Francis
Bacon's earlier utopia, New Atlantis, and credited to “R. H. Esquire”.
35
Id., at 191–3.
36
See Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes and Research Contracts 73 AM. ECO.
REV. 691, note 15 (1983), and accompanying text. See also Michael Abramowitz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56
VAND. L. REV. 115, note 15 (2003), for further sources and commentary on the historical use of rewards.
37
See, e.g., ROBERT MACFIE, RECENT DISCUSSIONS ON THE ABOLITION OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM, FRANCE, GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS 84–7 (1869).
38
Machlup & Penrose provided an excellent account of the historical context for Macfie's arguments; see Fritz
Machlup and Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECO. HIST. 1 (1950).
39
Michael Polanvyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV. ECO. STUD. 61 (1944).
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systems to reward inventors, might well be more efficient.40
The system of “inventors' certificates” employed by the former Soviet Union41 was a
notable example of a large-scale reward infrastructure. The example is hardly inspirational. But
importantly, it seems that the problems of research and innovation in the U.S.S.R. were stemmed
from much larger difficulties with industrial organization, rather than from the prevalence of
rewards in place of patents.42
There is little doubt that the most significant difficulty with industrial rewards is the need
to index them to the value of inventions. The extent to which an invention is adopted provides
significant hints, but such information may be difficult to collect. Even if complete demand
curves for relevant items can somehow be measured, the magnitude of the utility provided by
each use remains unknown, because saleable products usually comprise much more than a single
invention.43
Consequently, although the literature considering the real-world practicality of rewards
for inventions appears inadequate,44 it is probable that their greatest drawback is a lack of
information revelation. Unless a government has sufficient information to tightly couple rewards
to the social value of inventions, R&D incentives might turn out skewed and suboptimal.
Therefore, any successful patent-replacing reward infrastructure must have a robust mechanism
40

See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY. (1962) (discussing the desirability of governments employing contractors to
perform research and development); Wright, supra note 36 (for a comparison of patents, rewards and contracts);
Steve P. Calandrillo, An economic analysis of intellectual property rights: justifications and problems of exclusive
rights, incentives to generate information, and the alternative of a government-run reward system, 9 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301 (1998) (arguing for the superiority of rewards against both patents and
copyright); Steven Shavell and Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECO.
525 (2001) (for a comparison of rewards, patents and a mixed regime); Michael Kremer, Patent buyouts: a
mechanism for encouraging innovation, 113 Q. J. ECO. 1137 (1998) (for a more exotic scheme in which
governments purchase patents for the public domain using an auction-based information revelation system);
Abramowitz, supra note 36 (surveying, critiquing and synthesizing recent proposals).
41
The Soviet Union applied reward models to both inventions and writing. See J. W. BAXTER, WORLD PATENT LAW
AND PRACTICE 14–21 (second edition 1973); M. M. BOGUSLAVSKY, COPYRIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC WORKS 130–5 (1979); SERGE L. LEVITSKY,
INTRODUCTION TO SOVIET COPYRIGHT LAW (1964); Dietrich A. Loeber, “Socialist” Features of Soviet Copyright
Law, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 297 (1984), for descriptions of Soviet “intellectual property” systems.
42
On the problems of Soviet industrial R&D, see, e.g., Veronika Kabalina and Simon Clarke, Innovation in PostSoviet Industrial Enterprises, in PROC. 6TH WORLD CONFERENCE OF THE ICCEES (2000),
http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/complabstuds/russia/Innopap.doc; LOREN R. GRAHAM, SCIENCE IN RUSSIA AND
THE SOVIET UNION: A SHORT HISTORY 179–80 (1993).
43
Cf. Patrick Croskey, Institutional Utilitarianism and Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 631, 639–40
(1993) (criticizing Polanvyi's proposal on account of the informational difficulties it raises). But cf. Shavell & van
Ypersele, supra note 40, 541–2 (expressing optimism that ex post sales information in the hands of a government
could be as effective as the ex ante information possessed by inventors).
44
It is possible that there is interesting material in Russian. Personal communication with several investigators who
have searched for it has suggested that there was a lack of high-quality introspective examination of the Soviet
industrial R&D system.
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for identifying the value of information.

2. Rewards for Writing and other Copyright Subject Matter

Suggestions that it might be desirable to replace patents with publicly funded alternatives
have been relatively persistent, even in democratic capitalist societies. In contrast, copyright
skeptics have historically been less enthusiastic in recommending that copyright be replaced with
a system of public funding.45
The likely explanation for this distinction is that the perceived losses to society as a result
of patent monopolies were much higher than those caused by copyright monopolies. Two
interconnected reasons are the functional nature of patentable inventions,46 and the relative
strength of patent rights.47 Furthermore, the visible example of rewards for authors in communist
states was intimately linked with a highly objectionable system of censorship, on one hand, and
state patronage of ideologically acceptable writers on the other.48
The near-consensus in favor of exclusive rights for authors has begun to weaken with the
advent of digital networks. The prospect of universal, scarcity-free access to the much of
humanity's knowledge and culture has inspired a growing number of claims that government
funding might become desirable.49
45

But see infra note 124 for two examples of 20th century discussion of the issue.
The impact of functionality on debates about monopoly incentives and reward systems for particular kinds of
information goods can be seen clearly with the inclusion of software, which is predominantly functional, in the
copyright system. Note particularly the influence of the Free Software Foundation, and note their early argument
that a “software tax” could be used to fund code (see Richard M. Stallman, The GNU Manifesto, Free Software
Foundation, (1985), at http://www.gnu.org/gnu/manifesto.html).
47
Following the analysis of Drahos (see PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Chapter 6
(1996), patent protection is “exclusive”, prohibiting the re-implementation of an idea. Copyright, in contrast, is
“preventative”, and covers only a particular expression of the idea. The presence of the idea/expression dichotomy,
combined with fair use and other territorial limitations and exceptions, substantially reduces the extent to which
copyright directly inhibits creative activity.
48
See Levitsky, supra note 41; Loeber, supra note 41.
49
The development of this idea can be seen in proposals to extend levy-based compulsory or blanket licenses for
private copying to widespread private (including peer-to-peer) digital copying; see (chronologically): Richard M.
Stallman, The Right Way to Tax DAT, WIRED MAG. Jul./Aug. 1992, http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/dat.html;
Brendan M. Schulman, The Song Heard 'Round the World: The Copyright Implications of MP3s and the Future of
Digital Music, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 590, 628–30 (1999) (arguing for compulsory licenses to facilitate the use of
works in digital contexts); William W. Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities, in PROC. “A FREE
INFORMATION
ECOLOGY
IN
THE
DIGITAL
ENVIRONMENT”
CONF.
§
IV.
2
(2000),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/Academic_Affairs/coursepages/tfisher/Music.html (arguing that taxation-based blanket
licenses would be preferable to the status quo); Glynn S. Lunney, The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology,
Private Copying, and the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 911–8 (2001); Raymond Shih Ray
Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 269, § VI (2002). Libraries, and public lending rights, have also been an inspiration; see David H. Rothman,
Information Access for All COMPUTERWORLD Jul. 6 1992, http://www.teleread.org/computerworld.htm; Joshua H.
46
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I noted above that rewards might constitute a general-purpose alternative to digital
(exclusive) copyrights. I then observed that, at least in the pre-digital era, they were only really
contemplated as completed alternative to a patent system. Public reward systems do in fact
operate today in relation to copyright subject matter, but they serve as an addition to those
exclusive rights, rather than a replacement for them. Examples of these kinds of additional
rewards are the co-incidental incentives provided by universities (including the prospect of
progression in an academic career) or by the various literary awards that can provided a
significant fraction of a writer's income. But it is implausible to suggest that either of these
institutions could be expanded to finance an entire information economy.
Perhaps of more interest are two further examples of copyright-oriented reward systems.
These are institutions that constitute a part of many countries' copyright systems, and suggest
ways that rewards could be used to replace or redefine digital copyright, at least as far as the
consumer sphere is concerned. They are the “public lending rights” (PLRs) that operate in public
libraries, and the statutory licenses that create levy-based “private copying schemes”.
Public lending rights systems are perhaps closest to a complete reward system, allowing
users access to large bodies of works through libraries without direct payment. Their nature and
legal status varies widely with jurisdiction.50 Generally speaking, however, they involve
observing the books borrowed from a “representative sample” of libraries, and then allocating
rewards to authors in proportion to the frequency of loans for their writings.

Foley, Enter the Library: Creating a Digital Lending Right, 16 CONN. J. INT. L. 369 (2001). Not all of the proposals
work from precedents in existing copyright systems; see Calandrillo, supra note 40 (advocating government funded
rewards, funded by income taxation, as replacements for both copyright and patents); Stallman, supra note 46
(advocating a tax on computers, allocated by both users and government, to fund software production); Shavell &
van Ypersele, supra note 40, at 541–2 (although Shavell and van Yperseles’ modeling is focused on the patent
system “for concreteness”, they do mention the possibility of copyright-replacing rewards based on usage
measurement surveys).
A few authors have been developing detailed proposals for taxation-funded blanket licenses, contemporaneously
with my own work. See James Love, Artists Want to be Paid: The Blur/Banff Proposal, (2002), at
http://www.nsu.newschool.edu/blur/blur02/user_love.html; Neil W. Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to
Allow
Free
Peer-to-Peer
File
Sharing,
17
HARV.
J.L.
&
TECH.
1
(2003),
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/nnetanel/null.pdf; William W. Fisher, An Alternative Remuneration System,
Chapter 6 of PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (forthcoming), (2004),
http://tfisher.org/PTK.htm; cf. Peter Eckersley, Virtual Markets for Virtual Goods: An Alternative Conception of
Digital Copyright, Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia Working Paper 02-03, v2 (May 2003)
http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/~pde/writing/virtualmarkets.pdf. Comparative references are included at some of the
relevant points in this paper.
50
See Silke von Lewinski, Public Lending Right: A General and Comparative Survey of the Existing Systems in Law
and Practise, 154 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 3 (1992). Aspects of variation include the
inclusion of works other than books; the kinds of libraries which are included; the sampling techniques used to
determine borrowing frequency; the way that payments are divided between authors and publishers; whether the
schemes are legally a part of the copyright system, and the extent to which they are open to foreign authors.
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Statutory licensing regimes primarily address the copying, in private, of music or video.
Acknowledging the impracticalities (and in some countries, the unconstitutionality) of
attempting to enforce copyright inside people's homes,51 these systems compensate rights holders
using the proceeds of levies raised on various devices and blank media. They were conceived as
a way of addressing reproduction which simply could not be prevented, and in the light of DRM,
the European Union — home to most of the world's private copying schemes — has been
exploring plans to phase them out.52 In the mean time, without legislative adjustments, it was
expected that they could not apply to the semi-public acts of copying found on file sharing
networks.53
It is likely that such localized reward systems have been adopted for writing more widely
than they have for inventions because it is easier to obtain some usable estimation of the (market)
value of a book or a record, than it is for an arbitrary invention. Public lending rights and private
copying schemes clearly suggest the possibility of creating general-purpose mechanisms to
remunerate authors, artists and publishers in contexts where exclusive rights are inefficient,
undesirable or impossible to enforce. And digital technology may provide the means for ensuring
that the rewards from these systems are fairly distributed according to the social value of each
work.

51

See, e.g., GILLIAN DAVIES AND MICHELLE E. HUNG, MUSIC AND VIDEO PRIVATE COPYING: AN INTERNATIONAL
SURVEY OF THE PROBLEM AND THE LAW (1993); Katerina Gaita and Andrew F. Christie, Principle or Compromise?
Understanding the original thinking behind statutory licence and levy schemes for private copying, Intellectual
Property
Research
Institute
of
Australia
Working
Paper
04-04,
May
2004,
http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/ipria/publications/workingpapers/IPRIA WP 04.04.pdf (discussing the nature, scope
and origins of analogue private copying schemes).
52
See P.BERNT HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., THE FUTURE OF LEVIES IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT: FINAL REPORT Chapter 6
(1995), http://www.ivir.nl/publications/other/DRM vies-report.pdf. (an independent report commissioned by the
Business Software Alliance; Chapter 6 addresses how the EU might implement its stated goal of phasing out private
copying levies in the era of DRM). There are a number of reasons why these systems were politically unpopular in
cyberspace. Many rights holders and advocates of strong exclusive rights fear that levies legitimize activities which
have the potential to replace large segments of the original market for information goods. Some artists and users
perceive the limitations of collecting societies as problematic (particularly because they can only employ indirect
estimates of which works are copied privately, users lack any input into the system, and underground/alternative
markets may escape consideration). Unpopularity amongst users is further exacerbated because they see levies as a
tax which goes directly to publishing companies (this may, partially, be a problem of perceptions)
53
Id., at 41. But the law in Canada appears to be following a different trajectory, at least temporarily; see Copyright
Board of Canada, Tariff of Levies to Be Collected by CPCC in 2003 and 2004 on the Sale, in Canada, of Blank
Audio
Recording
Media,
CAN.
GAZETTE
PART
I
(SUPPLEMENT),
20–1
http://www.cbcda.gc.ca/tariffs/certified/c13122003-b.pdf (Dec. 13 2003) [hereinafter Copyright Board of Canada] (determining
that downloading a file from a peer-to-peer network is legal, provided the destination medium for the copy is
covered by the scheme, and the copy is for the personal use of the downloader); BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe,
2004 FC 488 (Ottawa, Mar. 31 2004) http://www.fct-cf.gc.ca/bulletins/whatsnew/T-292-04.pdf 14–15 (dicta stating
that, until Canada implements the WIPO Copyright Treaty, making files available on a P2P network would not
attract secondary “authorization” liability).
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B. Decentralized Compensation Systems: Constructing “Virtual Markets”
Let us consider how we might construct a reward mechanism specifically for digital
information goods. Placing the standards of copyright aside, imagine a tax-paying Internet user
— suppose her name is Alice54 — who wishes to use digital music and writing55 in an
unrestricted fashion. How should Alice's society reward the creation of the works which Alice
values?
One option would be to count how often different works are downloaded by Alice and
others like her. The government could organize a basic server infrastructure,56 and distribute
rewards in proportion to the popularity of content. Although simple, such a system suffers from
the drawback that it cannot determine how much people actually like the different works they
access. For example, if Alice downloads two songs, listens to the first, and then deletes it, but
listens to the second song every day, the two artists would receive the same reward. It is also
limited to works which are downloaded directly, rather than distributed on home-recorded
media.57
The relative merits of different works might be more accurately observed by asking the
public to vote on the matter. By giving Alice a certain number of votes (say 100 per month, for
the sake of example), she could express her preferences in a more accurate fashion. If she has
read a novel which is particularly disappointing, she might not reward it at all, or might give it
only a symbolic vote or two. On the other hand, when a novel is extraordinary, she might give it
all 100 votes, or an ongoing reward each time she re-reads it. The disadvantage of regular voting
is the effort it involves — continually rating numerous snippets of authorship and artistry could
be a chore which many people were inclined to avoid.
But neither counting downloads, nor collecting votes, are particularly elegant solutions.
Alice might find a hybrid solution more efficacious. The arrangement would, ultimately, be a
voting system — but with special software and infrastructure to make accurate voting easy, and
54

Sincere apologies are due to both Lewis Caroll and the cryptographic research community (who have a fictitious
Alice in the regular employ of their thought experiments).
55
By “writing”, I refer not only to linear texts which might be made available through the Internet, but websites
which have significant informational or literary value and which require significant funding to stay afloat.
56
The central authority would not necessarily need to serve the downloads themselves — just provide digital
certificates for the content, and collect authentication information from the users.
57
In the long term, high-bandwidth connectivity will make physical media increasingly redundant. In the short term,
CDs and DVDs will continue to be important for distributing both legal and copyright-infringing information. To a
large extent, the nature of this traffic will be inferable from download statistics and blank media sales.

17

to reduce the impact of non-participation.
To illustrate this idea, imagine that Alice is listening to some music, or perhaps intending
to download a few new songs for her collection. Because she hasn't voted for the past month, her
download client pops up with a notice mentioning that she should do so.
Alice now has three choices. She could refuse to vote completely (in which case, her
downloads alone would be counted).58 She could spend the time to vote explicitly, carefully
considering which works had been of the most value to her recently. Finally, she could allow her
computer to suggest a vote.
In this last case, the software and devices she uses to read, listen to and watch
information goods, have been collecting statistics on her recent preferences — which songs she's
picked out of her playlist, which e-books she's spent hours poring over, and so on. But rather
than shipping this information straight off to the virtual market, it is simply handed to Alice on a
digital platter. If she wishes, she only has to vote with her mouse to precisely reward the
particular musicians and writers who have been contributing to her life.59
If Alice's computer has a representative record of her relative usage of different works,
we might ask why it does not automatically report that information to the virtual market. This
architecture would certainly possible, though it would present a number of difficulties. Firstly,
direct usage metering might not provide any better information than a voting system, because
users who were determined to reward something other than that which they actually consumed,
could (for example) easily leave a song playing, on repeat, with the volume turned down.
Secondly, individuals who, for whatever reason, were uneasy with any form of monitoring, even
pseudonymous monitoring, of their private actions, would have a clear motivation to interfere
with the metering system. A system which treats Alice with respect, giving her the explicit
choice between convenient automation and alternatives she could have achieved anyway, is more
likely to earn her respect in return.
I have termed this mechanism a “virtual market” not because it is a “market” which
happens to operate on the Internet. Instead, it is virtual in stronger senses of the word — a sort of
“market through the looking-glass”.60 Despite the involvement of public funding, the rewards
58

Downloads might be assigned less weight than explicit votes by users, to reflect their lower degree of interest in
information production, and to provide an incentive for voting. The economic effects of this policy are considered
below — see infra § III.C.5.
59
And of course, she does not have to accept this suggested vote at face value - she can simply use it as a starting
point for a customized selection.
60
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary provides the following definitions (amongst others) for the word `virtual':
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and incentives which flow from VMRS are very similar to those which would result from the
exchange of goods and currency in a marketplace, although these exchanges do not occur
directly.61 And while there is a centralized governmental authority which collects taxation and
distributes royalties, the determination of which information goods should be produced remains a
decentralized and emergent result of the privately held knowledge and preferences spread
throughout society.

1. Network Security
It is absolutely essential that any VMRS infrastructure be robust in the face of softwarebased attack on client systems. If this were not the case, then worms, virii, trojan horses and
direct computer security breaches which affect Alice's computer, could all grant the perpetrators
control over hard financial resources. Although it would be difficult for crackers to collect such
funds anonymously, the risk is still too great to be allowed.
The virtual market's security architecture is also responsible for preventing “ballot
stuffing”. No artist or any other individual should be able to skew the operation of the system by
downloading thousands of copies of a song, or by voting over and over again for the same
website. This is achieved by authenticating the identity of the user whenever a download or vote
is made, and then normalizing the information recorded, so that no individual can have more
than a certain, limited, effect on the system as a whole.
Fortunately, the task of confirming that Alice has in fact downloaded or voted for a
particular piece of music or writing can be performed in cheap, digitally secure hardware.62 A
simple device63 to perform this task might comprise:

“...so in essence or effect although not formally or actually”, and the “apparent... image resulting from the effect of
reflection... upon rays of light”.
61
The virtual market model may thus be able to evade the objection to publicly funded authorship on the grounds
that it is not “market based”, and so hands control of publishing to the state; see, e.g., Shira Perlmutter,
Convergence and the Future of Copyright, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS, 167 (2001); GILLIAN DAVIES, COPYRIGHT
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 149–55 (1994); cf. Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's
Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, § 4 (1992) (reaching a related conclusion on the
advantages of market-based, over judicially administered licensing systems).
62
Secure against remote interference, as opposed to physically secure against tampering. For simple functionality,
achieving the former is relatively feasible. Security against physical tampering is an extremely difficult problem; see
infra §III.C.2.
63
One might be tempted to call it a “dongle”; it does have some properties in common with the gadgets commonly
employed in the 1980s as software copy protection devices, although its purpose is, in a sense, the exact opposite;
and it does not suffer from the same classes of categorical insecurity. Perhaps “antidongle” would be more
appropriate.

19

•

microcontroller with an embedded private key,64 to create digital signatures

•

A symmetric cipher implementation to provide a secure communications channel65

•

A small LCD (liquid crystal display) to show the name of a creative work, and its author

•

A “confirm” button

•

A connection to a PC (this could be any standard data connection, such as a serial or USB
(universal serial bus) port)
Whenever Alice wants to download or vote for material in the VMRS, she would need to

confirm that the transaction presented on the LCD was correct.66 The device could then sign the
details, creating an unforgeable receipt to be passed into the virtual market.67 The cost of
producing such a device in volume would be at most a few dollars, and would not place a
troublesome burden upon an information economy.
Some users might be willing to pay for extra features, such as wireless networking, or a
more sophisticated user interface for adjusting their votes. These could be added to more
expensive voting devices without compromising the security of the system.

64

Private keys form a part of asymmetric cryptosystems, which can provide both secure digital signatures and public
key encryption (secure message “envelopes”). In this case, the private key is a unique secret stored in each device,
while the public key is kept on record with the virtual market administration. Anyone possessing the public key can
confirm that a message signature was produced by the (secret) private key (possession of the public key also allows
the creation of messages which only the private key can decipher). Suitable algorithms might include those
introduced by ElGamal, or a special signature scheme with additional privacy-preserving properties; see Taher
ElGamal, A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms, 31 IEEE TRANSACTIONS
INFO. THEORY 469 (1985); infra note 248 and accompanying text.
65
A symmetric cipher allows two parties who share a common secret “key” to send messages which only the other
can read. If any volume of data needs to be exchanged, symmetric ciphers have the advantage that they are much
faster than public key methods. A good choice might be AES/Rijandel (see http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/aes/
(2003)), since it is efficient when used in minimalist hardware.
66
The device thus defends against the class of attacks discussed in Howard Gobioff et al., Smart Cards in Hostile
Environments, in PROC. 2ND USENIX WORKSHOP ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, 1 (1996), http://www2.cs.cmu.edu/~hgobioff/papers/usenix_ecommerce_96.ps.
67
Astute readers may observe that, although secure authentication hardware can guarantee that Alice must have
approved each important transaction, an attacker with control of Alice's PC might subtly alter the information
provided for approval in the first place. Such mischief could be detected relatively quickly, either by vigilant users,
or through the employment of networks of honeypots — computers which pretend to be participating in the virtual
market, but which actually serve to identify assailants and analyze their behavior; see generally LANCE SPITZNER,
HONEYPOTS: TRACKING HACKERS Chapter 3 (2003) (on the history and definition of honeypots).
Detection would make attempts to collect large illicit payments from the virtual market rather risky. And honeypots
analysis would, on a statistical basis, allow most of the mis-reportage of use to be corrected. While having to take
such measures would be inconvenient, they would prevent the possibility of vote-stealing leading to widespread
funding misallocation.
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If a VMRS were implemented using secure hardware of this form, its systems would not
be an easy target for cybercrime. Instead of being able to collect rewards from millions of
consumers by writing a carefully constructed virus, each incidence of fraud would require the
attacker to physically interfere with a piece of hardware. As a result, the cost of attempting to
subvert VMRS at the network level becomes much higher than the potential rewards.

2. Human Security

In addition to the precondition that the VMRS network be resistant to electronic attack, it
is also particularly important to guarantee that there are no systematic incentives for consumers
to trick the virtual market in some way. If votes can be exchanged for direct material assistance,
if they are in practice fungible with cash, then they lose their particular social purpose — which
is to facilitate the production of public goods. Incentives to “cash in” votes would, at the very
least, reduce the quality of the information in the virtual market, and, at worst, render the whole
system infeasible.
Straightforward examples of this are Alice voting for herself, or pre-arranged voting in
small cliques.68 Alice and her family might vote for her sister Delilah, who has created a fake
artist's account. Some forms of clique voting may be automatically preventable without
necessarily compromising pseudonymity.69 The family plot to channel votes to Delilah could be
foiled by a requirement that artists receive support from a significant number of users, before
being eligible for remuneration. That way, the family can vote for Delilah only if many other
people are also doing so, thereby indicating that she is actually an artist.
A related and perhaps more serious fraud risk is the deliberate transferal of identity. In
this situation, Alice could “rent” her voting power to an “artist” (or a network of conspirators) in
exchange for cash. This at first seems like a serious threat, because if it occurs with the consent
68

I use the word “clique” here in its ordinary English (as opposed to mathematical) sense. Formally, the situation of
concern is a smallish group of voters (less than a few hundred), whose votes flow exclusively, or almost exclusively,
to other members of the clique.
69
Pseudonymity here refers to the fact that although different votes made by the same person can be linked together,
they cannot be linked to that individual. In this case, pseudonymity applies to all the ordinary users of the system,
but not to performers who actually collect money from it (since these are the people who are actually able to vote for
themselves or each other). This corresponds with Froomkin's definition of the term (see A. Michael Froomkin,
Anonymity and Its Enmities J. ONLINE L. (1995), at http://www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/95_96/froomkin.html),
although if this privacy cannot be compromised, a case can be made for describing it as “anonymity with persistent
nyms”; see Roger Clarke, Identified, Anonymous and Pseudonymous Transactions: The Spectrum of Choice, in
PROC.
USER
IDENTIFICATION
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PRIVACY
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CONFERENCE
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3.6
(1999),
http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/UIPP99.html.
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of all parties, it will be almost impossible to detect. There may, however, be a simple and
efficacious mechanism for preventing identity rental. The key is to make the agreements upon
which trades are based very difficult to enforce — in this case, by making it costly to verify that
Alice's vote has in fact been cast for a particular person.70 If votes are independently
unverifiable, then one would have to actually keep the seller's secure voting hardware (the simple
device described in the previous section), in order to reliably buy votes.71
Another risk to consider is that Alice might consider selling her voting hardware. She will
only do this if the price she is offered exceeds the costs of making the sale (which include lost
opportunities, risks and side effects). To begin with, she might choose to sell because an artist
could offer her half of the (present discounted) value of her future votes, which would easily
outweigh the small risk of being caught. But the balance could be shifted, if the card has a dual
purpose which gives it a direct value to the holder. It might function as a credit or debit card, a
public transport card, or a link to some other valuable service;72 if the costs associated with
loosing this gadget are greater than the financial benefits of selling it, Alice would be wise to
keep it.
It is inevitable that some people will attempt to find ways to exploit an alternative
compensation system. By making the barriers to entry high, it can be ensured that such attempts
are not widespread. And by making attempted exploits both risky and unreliable, it can be
ensured that business-minded criminals will find easier ways to make money. Like, perhaps
turning to art.

3. Funding Virtual Markets

The reader may by now be willing to believe in Alice, but I would not wish to stretch her
credulity to the existence of Wonderland — it is relatively easy to give money away, but first,
70

Accounting information, telling artists about the number of votes they have received, forms a channel in the sense
of Shannon; see Claude E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYS. TECHNICAL J. 379
(1948), http://cm.bell-labs.com/cm/ms/what/shannonday/shannon1948.pdf. The problem of determining the
verifiability of particular votes, as a function of the granularity of users' choices, the number of other votes being
received by the same work or artist, and any quantization and noise introduced by the VMRS, is deserving of a brief
article in itself. It is probable that there exist ways of making verifiability unprofitable, though there might be some
tradeoffs against the ideal degree of specificity in the rewards which artists receive.
71
If Alice was allowed to keep the hardware, she could take cash from the conspiracy, but simultaneously continue
to reward her favorite artists.
72
Although these proposals are inter-institutional, they may be beneficial to both parties, by providing secure,
pseudonymous authentication, in an elegant and efficient manner. It might also be desirable to have the devices
perform both pseudonymous and identifying authentications, for different applications, using separate keys.
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one must obtain it from somewhere; where there is “public” funding, one usually finds a private
taxpayer. With taxation, the question “on whom, and how much?” must be answered, because it
plays a central role in determining the economic properties (and political fashionability) of any
policy endeavor.
In the case at hand, a related, and equally central question, is how the total level of
funding for the entire virtual market is set. The interaction between these two variables is itself
variable: different flavors of taxation place different constraints on the level of funding for the
entire VMRS.
There is a wide range of taxation models available for funding a virtualized copyright
mechanism. One important criterion for choosing amongst them is that consumers should pay tax
which is closely in proportion to the amount they would have spent on relevant information
goods, had a non tax-based system been employed. The intuitive “fairness” of the system, to a
large extent, depends on this proportionality. But there are other considerations which should
also be given weight. Charging more from those with greater ability to pay, and adopting a tax
formula which is easy to enforce and difficult to sidestep, will improve both normative “fairness”
and utilitarian efficiency. Tradeoffs must be made between these three criteria.
The most straightforward solution is to raise levies on goods and services which are
directly complimentary with the consumption of digital culture. This is the approach used in
existing private copying systems,73 and has been advocated for use in alternative compensation
schemes.74 The obvious candidates for these levies include internet connectivity, bandwidth,
blank storage media (recordable CDs and DVDs, and perhaps even hard disks), specialized
devices for watching, listening to or reading digital culture; or even computers in general.75
The chief drawback with these sources of revenue is that they are only imperfect proxies
for the underlying consumption (or otherwise) of the information goods in question. Taxing a
whole class of activities or gadgets, some members of which did not implicate copyright in the
first place, amounts to a cross-subsidy to those that do. Beyond a certain point, such cross73

See, e.g., Copyright Board of Canada, supra note 53 (setting levy rates on cassettes, recordable CDs, and memory
in dedicated MP3 players); Australian Copyright Council, Remuneration for private copying in Australia: A
Discussion Paper, (2001) 9–10, http://www.copyright.org.au/PDF/Articles/PrivCopDiscPprAV.pdf (tabulating the
kinds of levies used in national private copying schemes).
74
See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 49, at 43–4.
75
One immediate concern which could be raised about these levies is that the computer and consumer electronics
industry firms whose products are affected, necessarily constitute an insurmountable political obstacle. This
argument is fallacious, because the increased availability of digital works will cause a corresponding increase in
demand for these goods. It is possible that an alternative compensation system could, in toto, increase sales on the
levied items.
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subsidization may be seen as unfair, and it may, even at small rates, also cause distortionary
economic side effects.76 To illustrate: taxing blank storage devices and media discourages
backups.77 Taxing bandwidth usage would encourage people to switch to less data-intensive
activities: listening to music rather than watching a film, or from downloading songs to
downloading books. Taxing MP3 players and e-books too heavily would encourage the use of
general-purpose computers in their place; taxing computers avoids that problem but may lead to
others if it means that some people delay upgrading their machines, suffering with an old, slow
computer on account of the tax.78
Alternately, virtual markets could be funded solely by general revenue sources, such as
progressive income taxation.79 Although there are distortionary effects involved in income
taxation, these may be balanced by potential redistributive welfare improvements.80
One argument against the use of general revenue sources is that there is a redistribution of
resources, from taxpayers who do not use the Internet for cultural consumption, to support the
creation of digital culture. This will occur, although it is not necessarily problematic. Incentives
to produce digital writing and music will (almost always) result in more and cheaper works in
tangible forms; and if a progressive form of taxation is employed, the demographics which pay

76

Taxation is said to be distortionary when it causes shifts between the production and consumption of one kind of
good, and another, causing divergence from the “natural state” of a free market. Distortions are usually expected to
decrease social welfare, unless they act to correct externalities (side effects of actions, such as the pollution caused
by driving a car) or redistribute wealth in a way that decreases inequality.
77
Blank media taxes might also, theoretically, affect those who use such media for their own artistic creation. But
because the cost of digital media is a small component of the cost of creative activity, this effect is unlikely to be
substantial.
78
This would be a serious problem if those affected included business users of computers, because the particular
information goods provided by the virtual market would not be of much use to businesses (see infra §II.B.5 for
further explanation). It might or might not be possible to avoid charging levies on computers purchased by firms,
depending on the ease with which individuals can avoid taxes by deeming themselves to be businesses. If this
discrimination is not possible, but a levy on computers was still considered desirable, there are several possible
solutions. One would simply be to reduce the income tax rate paid by corporations to compensate. Another would be
to allocate a proportionate slice of the levy revenue to providing public goods which increase the value of computers
to businesses, such as setting Internet standards, automating bureaucratic interactions with government, or
preventing malicious “black-hat” computer crime.
79
Taxation is said to be progressive when the rate of incidence is higher on wealthier individuals. Fisher, for
example, advocates this kind of revenue source; see Fisher, supra note 49, at 24–5 (settling on income taxation as
the most desirable, if not the most politically feasible, way to raise revenue for an alternative compensation system).
80
Shavell & van Ypersele recommend income taxation as the most efficient way of funding a reward system to
replace patents; see Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 40, note 45 and accompanying text. They also argue that the
use of intellectual property privileges to fund the creation of information goods carries its own distortionary
consequences (although I would add that these distortions will only occur in the strong monopoly case where
information prices rise above average production costs), and cite the optimistic results of Kaplow on the efficiency
of funding public good production through income taxation; see Louis Kaplow, The optimal supply of public goods
and the distortionary cost of taxation, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 513 (1996).
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disproportionate taxes are precisely those in which Internet usage is most pervasive.81 But the
point may be moot, if it is possible to ensure that the progressive tax is only paid by those with
Internet access.
An income tax used to fund artistic production could simultaneously be constructed as a
surcharge on internet connectivity. This could be done directly, by having the tax agency
calculate a surcharge on each Internet connection, or indirectly, by offering a tax credit or
reduction to citizens who do not have Internet connections. It would have many of the merits of
both progressive and levy-based funding models.
Another way to achieve progressive levies on internet access would be to introduce a
surcharge on residential Internet access, which is proportional to the valuation of the property to
which the connection is made. This structure has the benefit of being less distortionary than an
income-dependent levy,82 although in the United States, it would be politically impractical for
historical reasons.83 The other hurdle for these particular levies is the difficulty of associating
wireless Internet connections with physical residences; were it not for the possibility that
wireless networks will become a primary component of Internet access infrastructure, I would
advocate this mechanism as the best revenue source for virtual markets. As it stands, property
value levies might be practical only once Internet connectivity is effectively universal — since at
that point, the levy could be charged on all occupied residential properties, rather than just the
ones with network connections.
Having chosen the form that taxation will take, it is then necessary to determine the rate
at which it is levied. Those rates are indirectly determinative of the total funding pool for the
virtual market — and thus of the amount which each artist receives from the system. Needless to
say, getting this right is both important and difficult.84
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See,
e.g.,
George
Sciadas,
Unveiling
the
Digital
Divide,
Statistics
Canada,
(2002),
http://www.statcan.ca/english/research/56F0004MIE/56F0004MIE2002007.pdf; U.S. Department of Commerce, A
Nation Online: How Americans Are Expanding Their Use of the Internet, (2002) 11,
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/anationonline2.pdf (statistics examining the correlation between income and
Internet access).
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See infra note xxx. I would like to thank Jamie Love for suggesting this solution to the problem of distortions in
labor supply.
83
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, cl. 3 & 9, cl. 4. (requiring that direct federal taxes be apportioned among the states
according to their populations); Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Circuit-Specific Application of the Internal Revenue Code: An
Unconstitutional Tax, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 113, § I.B (2003) (explaining the origins of the apportionment clause in
Southern fears of a disproportionate burden from taxes on land and slaves, and the enduring constraints on the nature
of federal property taxes).
84
Liebowitz illustrates this point powerfully by graphing album revenues over time (see Stan J. Liebowitz,
Alternative Copyright Systems: The Problems with a Compulsory License, (2003) at 16, at
http://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/intprop/complpff.pdf), although it would be helpful if his graph included a $y$-
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Fisher has emphasized that extrapolation from previous sales in the music industry would
be invaluable in ensuring a smooth transition from existing systems of cultural distribution.85 The
idea is that the amount of tax raised would be adjusted to replace the amount of revenue lost to
the industry through file sharing. While helpful in the short term, this approach gives little longrun guidance.86
There are several more sustainable strategies for setting the tax rates used to fund an
alternative compensation system. The simplest is to rely on a governmental or administrative
decision making process, in the hope that various interests groups will end up agreeing on a
compromise which is fairly good. Artists and publishers want higher rates; ISPs and hardware
manufacturers want lower rates. Taxpayers want lower rates, unless they are so low that they end
up harming the supply of works. While it is possible that the administrative compromise would
be reasonable, there would be plenty of room for poor decisions and dissipation of resources
through regulatory contests and rent seeking.
At the other extreme, one might opt for complete decentralization in setting the total tax
level; users of the system are informed about the amount that artists are currently earning, they
know from experience the levels of subjectively relevant cultural output, and are then given a
regular choice to vote “higher” or “lower” for funding levels. From the perspective of economic
theory, this approach appears to be quite effective.87 But the task of ensuring that consumers are
sufficiently well informed to vote rationally in such a system, and the improbable prospect of
governments surrendering control over certain tax rates, makes this possibility more of a
theoretical curiosity than a serious policy option.
There is an intermediate option, which I believe represents the best combination of
political plausibility and economic efficiency. The idea is to establish a statistical picture of the
“exchange rate” between willingness to pay and virtual market votes. This exchange rate could
be determined by using contingent valuation (CV) surveys on relatively small groups of
consumers.88 They are asked hypothetical questions, such as “at what level would a reduction in
intercept and compared this market with likely correlates, such as the health of the U.S. economy or sales of
complimentary goods.
85
Fisher, supra note 49, at 14.
86
Liebowitz, supra note 84, at 15.
87
See infra nn 195–199 and accompanying text.
88
Contingent valuation is a method in which public goods are valued based on carefully constructed surveys
administered to small focus groups. These surveys usually ask consumers how much they would be willing to pay
for the particular good, or conversely, how much they would be willing to accept as minimal compensation for the
loss of the good if it already exists. For examples of applications of CV for copyright-related purposes, see Peter
Bohm, Estimating Demand for Public Goods: An Experiment, 3 EUR. ECO. REV. 111 (1972); David J. Brennan,
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VMRS taxes paid be sufficient compensation for the loss of this album”, or “if this particular
album was not going to be made available online, how much would you be willing to pay to
obtain a copy privately?” When asked under carefully designed circumstances, these questions
tend to elicit accurate responses.89
Collecting data of this sort not only allows close-to-optimal tax rates to be determined,
but it provides an algorithmic test of the consistency of virtual market voting behavior. If the
willingness to pay values reported by consumers in CV surveys are not approximately
proportional to the votes those consumers actually made, then it is possible to infer that there are
systematic flaws or inconsistencies in the voting process.90
The taxation options that could be used to support virtual markets present a spectrum;
different choices will hold different implications in terms of wealth distribution and subsidy
effects for various industries. Section III.C.4 examines them a little further in an attempt to
identify some of their economic consequences. The commentary here should simply convince
the reader that there is a wide range of choices available, that these choices are capable of
serving a range of different normative goals, and that particular social and political contexts will
play a major role in deciding between them. A completely satisfactory investigation of these
issues is beyond the scope of this article.

4. One dollar, one vote?
And additional difference between funding mechanisms is that they can vary in whether
and how they enable a link to the distribution of funds to artists, from the amount paid by each
taxpayer — in other words, some funding models are inherently “one taxpayer/user, one vote”;
while others allow a choice between “one dollar one vote” and “one taxpayer one vote”
allocation formulas.
The simplest approach to administering the funding for a virtual market would be to leave
the collection of revenue separate from the process of distribution. Everyone pays their taxes,
and then Alice's vote (or usage, or downloads) determine a reward for each of the artists she
likes, rewards whose size is independent of the amount of tax she herself paid. This is a “one
Fair price and public goods: a theory of value applied to retransmission, 22 INT. REV. L. & ECO. 347 (2002). For
an overview of the issues involved in ensuring that CV data is accurate, see Richard T. Carson et al., Contingent
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Id., § III.
90
While detecting inconsistencies of this sort would not guarantee that they could be resolved, it would open the
possibility of either finding an underlying, addressable problem, or statistically correcting for the phenomenon.
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user, one vote” system. But under some circumstances, it may be possible to use Alice's
preference to allocate precisely the same amount of cash that she had contributed through
taxation.91 This “one dollar, one vote” approach would only be feasible for certain kinds of taxes
— it would be relatively easy for surcharges on ISP bills, harder for income taxes and
impractically costly for hardware or blank media levies.
“One dollar, one vote” taxation has some advantages and some drawbacks. On some
normative accounts, a democratic basis for culture would be particularly desirable, while others
might hold that the tastes of well-educated (and hence wealthier) taxpayers are more likely to
reach an underlying goal of aesthetic value. Utilitarian analysis would favor weighting by the
psychological intensity of demand, a troublesome quantity which might nonetheless be inferred
by willingness to part with dollars for complimentary goods92 or by indirect means, such as
whether individuals make the choice to vote.

5. Scope: Which Information Markets Could Be Made “Virtual”
(and Which Ones Matter)?
Throughout this paper, I am pursuing the claim that virtual markets might be a
normatively superior means for providing incentives for the production of digital writing (either
“e-books” or high-quality websites), music, and film. No claims are made on the subject of
software copyright, because, as I will argue, software is economically quite distinct from literary
and artistic goods. The problem of evaluating (or proposing alternatives to) exclusive rights in
software is separate from the one at hand.
Although the paper examines digital copyright in a broad range of works, I predict that
the problem — and therefore the value of any solution — will eventually turn out to be most
profound for writers. This is not only because the role of writing goes so far beyond
“entertainment” (in any sense), but because the crisis of copyright will in time be much more
intense for books than it is for music or cinematographic material. To begin with, writers rely far
more completely on copyright royalties than do musicians (who can perform live) or film
producers (who are likely to be able to maintain cinema revenues even in the face of intense
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I would like to thank Alan Toner for pointing out this possibility and its similarity to 100% tax credits on voluntary
donations to media organizations.
92
Although purchases of complimentary goods are still less informative than purchases of the actual cultural items in
question; this is an economic factor which favors DRM-based copyright; see infra text accompanying notes 213–
215.
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“napsterization”).93 Furthermore, the likelihood that DRM will ever work for writing seems
much lower than for more complicated information goods.94
At present, the only thing holding off a digital publishing crisis is the fact that electronic
devices remain far less convenient for reading than ordinary, printed books.95 The case for virtual
markets may be too weak to overcome the inertia of copyright in musical and cinematic works.
But once it is possible to curl up in bed with a leather-bound book filled with re-writeable digital
paper, the need for alternative compensation systems may rapidly become unavoidable.96
Importantly, the reader should also note that the claims made in this article are limited to
the desirability of virtual markets for the distribution of digital works to individual consumers.
They exclude business and commercial usage, because voting mechanisms are particularly
connected to the kind of private valuation applicable to cultural information goods.
In more theoretical terms, there are two major constraints on the kinds of information
goods to which virtual markets could most easily be applied. One constraint relates to the ability
of the voting mechanism to extract accurate information about the social value of the work; the
other relates to the ability of the VMRS to allocate a fair reward to each person who has
contributed to its creation.
The suggestion that virtual markets are most desirable for creative works — the market
for which is comprised of individuals, rather than businesses or other organizations — relates to
the “accurate information” constraint. The arguments presented in Section II.B.6 about
93

Writers can of course tour lecture circuits (indeed, they often do so in order to encourage sales of their books). But
there is little reason to believe that the skills required for great writing are always the same as those required for
great oration — or that the size and character of the market for speakers are in any way sufficient to compensate for
decreased remuneration from books.
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All it would ever take to extract a perfect unencrypted copy of a digital book from a trusted system would be a
camera capable of performing OCR (Optical Character Recognition). Once “liberated”, the book could easily be
distributed widely over a peer-to-peer network, including anonymizing networks, such as Freenet (see Clarke et al.,
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.), which, because of bandwidth overheads, have not proved particularly
effective for music. Any hopes of “traitor-tracing” such reproduction back to the original pirate would be hampered
by the extreme nature of any durable textual watermark; see Mikhail J. Atallah et al., Natural Language Processing
for Information Assurance and Security: An Overview and Implementations, in M. Schaefer, ed., PROC. NEW
SECURITY PARADIGM WORKSHOP, 51 (2000), http://omni.cc.purdue.edu/~vraskin/NSPW-2000.pdf; Mikhail J.
Atallah et al., Natural Language Watermarking and Tamperproofing, in PROC. 5TH INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON
INFORMATION HIDING (2002), http://omni.cc.purdue.edu/~vraskin/IHW-2002.pdf (constructing a textual watermark
with any degree of durability requires systematic alteration of words and phrases in the document).
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Many of the distinctions and disanalogies between the impact of digital technology on writing, and its impact on
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Significant progress has already been made towards the development of these technologies; see Ruth Wilson,
Digital Paper, Digital Ink, U.K. Universities' Joint Information Systems Committee Technology and Standards
Watch Report TSW 03-01, (2003), http://www.jisc.ac.uk/uploaded_documents/tsw_03_01.pdf (surveying existing
and forecasted “digital paper” technologies).
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individuals' incentives to provide correct information are based upon the direct connection
between appreciation and a user's vote. It is not so clear that there is an efficient way to link
value and the reporting of that value at an organizational level.
Another factor which makes alternative compensation systems more effective for
consumer (rather than commercial) works, relates to the relatively small range of expected prices
for these goods. As discussed below, this improves the information which VMRS provides about
the value of goods and increases the system's economic efficiency.97
The other constraint on the application of virtual markets results from their interactions
with the production of information goods. VMRS is well-suited for digital music, writing and
even film because these works tend to be monolithic. That is, the good is made from components
which are for the most part free standing, and the good is created once, rather than undergoing a
continuous process of maintenance and development. The importance of these properties is that
they make the task of allocating credit generally feasible.98
Information goods which are not monolithic — such as software — can present
intractable problems for VMRS because the task of rewarding authors collides with issues of
industrial organization.99 To see why this might occur, imagine Alice attempting to choose which
software has been of great use to her (so that she can vote for it). Perhaps she has found her
brand-new 3-dimensional web browser to be particularly helpful, so she gives it lots of votes.
But it may turn out that the 3D web interface was a relatively straightforward piece of code to
write, because most of the work had already been done in developing libraries for sophisticated
3D graphics, providing network functionality, and for handling web-related protocols and file
formats. Although it appears to Alice that the user interface level application is providing
numerous useful features, the actual work has been done by many separate components. In
addition, each of these software sub-structures may have been written by many different
contributors. The virtual market lacks sufficient information to determine where the reward
97

See infra § III.C.5.C.
As an admittedly anecdotal example, Dr. Jim Parker, the U.K. Public Lending Rights Commissioner, stated in a
September 2001 talk to the British Literary and Artistic Copyright Association, that he was aware of only one
intractable dispute between co-authors as to how rewards from a PLR should be split.
99
Once an information work becomes an organic, living entity, rather than a once-off creation, “peer production”
will frequently become the optimal way of organizing its development. For a discussion of the economic conditions
which lead to peer production, see Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112
YALE L.J. 369 (2003), http://www.benkler.org/CoasesPenguin.PDF.
I would like to thank the members of the informal intellectual property & information economics discussion group at
Melbourne University (especially Gavin Baker, Alan Blair, Rose Chan, Andrew Clausen, Suelette Dreyfus, Paul
Harrison, Toby Ord and Matt Pattison) who helped determine, through extensive gedanken experiments, that
arbitrary cultures of peer production are not easily combined with effective virtual market reward structures.
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should go.
In a marketplace of proprietary software,100 a complex web of contracts, negotiated
between software production firms with various levels of market power, acts to define the
relative remuneration received by different contributing firms. Compensation for individual
programmers is in turn defined by their employment contracts. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear
that the proprietary software market is an efficient way to create software in all (or even most)
situations.101 The problem of credit allocation goes to the heart of the creation of intellectual
property privileges in software,102 and a consumer-oriented policy proposal like VMRS is
insufficient for addressing it.
It is true that there are some forms of digital music and writing which are non-monolithic
and where similar credit allocation problems may arise. Consider, for example, the development
of general reference works, textbooks, collage art, or the compilation of sample libraries from
which others produce music. But these cases are the exception rather than the rule,103 and pale by
comparison with trying to reward the authors of a large, heterogeneous software project.104

6. The Role of Social Norms
Why should users participate in a VMRS? Surely it would be easier not to worry about
voting — to download files by whatever means was easiest, and to save time by not rewarding
the files' creators? I would argue that there are reasons why this is not a serious problem for
VMRS systems.
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Proprietary software is typically characterized by a number of properties. It is usually developed within a single
firm, by employees who assign their rights either by default or through work-for-hire contracts, to their employer.
The firm carries all of the development risk, and reaps all of the returns. Source code is normally protected as a trade
secret, while executable object code is distributed to customers. Exclusive rights from copyright (and sometimes
patent) law provide courses of action against unauthorized reproduction. The proprietary software development
process presents high-to-insurmountable barriers to outside contributions.
101
For critiques of the proprietary software production model, which are widely cited amongst programmers, see
Richard M. Stallman, Why Software Should Be Free, Free Software Foundation, (1992), at
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/shouldbefree.html; Eric S. Raymond, On Management and the Maginot Line, in
THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR. (2000), http://www.tuxedo.org/ esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedralbazaar/x340.html. For theoretical work which attempts to explain when open or closed development is efficient, see
Benkler, supra note 99.
102
For a serious normative treatment of these questions, see Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the
Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994).
103
If this were not the case, then transaction costs and strategic behavior associated with the exclusive right of
derivation would present a significant problem for the operation of copyright law. I leave the question of whether the
inclusion of software in the scope of copyright poses any such problems, for the consideration of the reader.
104
The Linux kernel (available at http://www.kernel.org) is a paradigmatic example here; as of version 2.4.17, there
were 408 significant contributors listed in the kernel's CREDITS file. Deciding the value of their relative
contributions fairly, and without interfering in the culture of Free Software development, is prohibitively
complicated.
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Firstly, note that it is important to ensure that participation is easy — that downloads or
usage can be tracked automatically, and that voting is not labor intensive. Previous sections
addressed these design problems.105
Provided that there are no barriers to participation, there is actually a direct and
unambiguous incentive to allocate one's votes in accordance with one's preferences. If you read a
book by an interesting writer, but fail to give them votes for their troubles, then it is less likely
that the author will write another book; even if they do publish again, it is likely to take longer,
because they will have to support themselves by other means. Enthusiastic following and support
for authors and artists is widespread, even in the absence of direct incentives.
There would none the less be a role for education in encouraging public spirited
participation in a VMRS. One can easily imagine cultures in which rewards would be allocated
“correctly”, in the sense of voter honesty, and cultures in which they would not be.106 This
educative task is far less daunting than the idea of convincing teenagers to respect DRM, because
a VMRS removes the need to “condition away” the free rider problem.107 Whilst self-interest
might dictate that many consumers should avoid technologies which prevent them from copying
files between computers, there are no serious reasons for individuals to avoid participating in
virtual markets.
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See supra text accompanying notes 58–66.
Many similar problems have been faced in the field of contingent valuation (CV), where surveys are employed to
value public (usually environmental) goods. Although there are a number of important differences (such as the role
of passive use, and the fact that CV is used for centralized decision making, rather than decentralized allocations),
the extensive research on the applicability of CV has shown that, if citizens are given appropriate information about
the role of their contributions, they will provide high-quality information on the value of public goods; see Carson et
al., supra note 88.
107
There have been regular claims that education will be critical to the success of technologically enforced copyright;
see, e.g., INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS Part
III (1995), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf; Education Programs Needed to Combat
Consumer Piracy, Experts Say, 2 WORLD E-COM. & IP REP. 25 (2002); Oliver R. Goodenough, The Future of
Intellectual Property: Broadening the Sense of “Ought”, 24 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 291 (2002) (a more
exaggerated development of this notion, which goes so far as to suggest that neuroscience may have a role in
conditioning people to obey copyright law).
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III.

AN ECONOMIC COMPARISON OF VIRTUAL MARKETS AND
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
Having proposed, in something approaching detail, an alternative to copyright enforced

by technology, a question follows naturally — “is a virtual market really a good idea?”
This section is an attempt to answer that question, to compare the economic properties of
VMRS and DRM as two alternative sets of institutions for funding cultural production. The
problem is intricate, and many details of the comparison deserve research projects of their own.
Indeed, this section can only reach the minimum depth necessary to genuinely address the
matter, and any analytic approach must at this point be limited by the absence of experience from
real-world attempts to build an alternative compensation system. But, pending practical
experimentation or more extensive research, and with some important caveats, I conclude that
the weight of probabilities lies in favor of a public funding scheme.
Section III.A makes some general observations on the economic nature of information
goods such as digital music and writing. Section III.B then examines the approaches available for
comparing VMRS and DRM, and discusses some of the conclusions that can be drawn from
existing literature on each approach. Although these methodologies shed some light on the
problem, it seems that there is no simple economic model which can be elegantly constructed
and yet shed substantial light on the desirability of virtual markets — there are simply to many
facets to the problem.108 Instead, Section III.C provides a structured argument from utilitarian
ethics109 to show that it is very likely that in the real world, a virtual market could be more
efficient than a “real” marketplace built out of digital locks.
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Although Section III.B.3 suggests a route by which rather more complicated models might be constructed to
realistically evaluate the impact of copyright (or alternatives) on an information society.
109
By utilitarian, I refer to a progressive interpretation of the Benthamite notion of “the greatest good for the
greatest number” — or maximizing some notional sum of fulfillment over the entire population. Note that, when
correctly applied, consequentialist utilitarianism should not discard the peculiarities of human nature, the subtleties
of social issues, or the importance of justice (as opposed to exclusively material welfare). This point frees
utilitarianism from many of the weaknesses of its neoliberal economic interpretation, and for example, I am not
following the distinction drawn between “utilitarianism” and “social planning theory” by Fisher; see William W.
Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY. (S.
Munzer, ed.2000), http://www.law.harvard.edu/Academic_Affairs/coursepages/tfisher/iptheory.html. Rather than
being differences in normative ethics, these two approaches represent different ways of estimating the same
quantities.
Utilitarianism is not a perfect moral philosophy, and I would not personally consider myself to be a utilitarian.
However, no other form of ethics has established the same degree of legitimacy when examining the public policy
questions faced by democratic societies.
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A. General Observations on the Economics of Copyright
1. Information as a Public Good
In economic theory, a good is said to be a public good when it possesses two properties
— it is non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Non-rivalrous goods are those which each member of
the community can enjoy, without detracting from the enjoyment of others. Orthogonally, once a
non-excludable good has been created, everyone benefits automatically. A public good is said to
be pure when it possesses these properties unambiguously. Impure public goods, which are
slightly rivalrous, or only excludable with difficulty, are much more common than pure public
goods.
Historically, writing and music have been rather impure public goods. More specifically,
the authorship of writing and music creates a pure public good, but the physical objects (books,
records, etc) which have embodied them are composite entities. A book in the hands of a reader
contains a public information good (the authorship) and a private physical good — the paper, ink
and distribution. As the digital forms of music and writing become increasingly practical, the
“impurity” of physical structure is removed, and the economic properties of copyright change,
moving closer to those of pure public goods.
Economic models suggest that in most cases, a free market will not produce adequate
quantities of public goods, because, at Nash equilibrium110 individuals will be “free riding” on
the public goods created by the rest of society.111 Even though everyone might be better off with
a greater level of the public good, there is no way to simultaneously persuade them all to
contribute to it.
There are various responses to this predicament. One is to raise taxes and appoint a
government to choose which public goods should be provided. The difficulty here is finding a
means by which governments can identify the desirable levels of different public goods, and a
suitable taxation system to collect the funds to pay for them.
Another response to the free rider problem is to attempt to remove the natural nonexcludability of the public good. Property rights can then be created to facilitate a “marketplace”
solution. Copyright law is a perfect example of such a strategy.
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Nash equilibrium is a state in which all actors are pursuing their own self-interest, in the face of similar strategies
from others.
111
Or, more accurately, “easy riding”, because Nash equilibrium contributions are often low but non-zero; see
Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, Easy Riders, Joint Production, and Public Goods, 94 ECO. J. 580 (1984).
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2. Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Copyright Law
There are two main costs associated with attempting to solve the free rider problem by
recreating excludability. These costs are central to the economics of copyright; I will outline
them briefly here:
The first is the direct cost of the exclusion mechanism. In the context of historical
copyright, this cost was quite low. It comprised the cost of policing the relevant laws — court
cases, copyright management and the creation of collecting societies, for example — but these
costs were probably small compared to the overall value of information goods to society. As I
argue below, however, the pure public good nature of digital information means that these costs
will be much higher in a DRM system.112
The second cost is the indirect cost of exclusion, which results from giving producers a
monopoly on access to the public goods they have created. Economists term this a deadweight
loss113 — in this case, the loss to society because some people who could be given the good at
the marginal cost of provision,114 but cannot or will not pay the copyright/monopoly price,115 are
denied it.
The economic analysis of copyright law has generally been concerned with determining
whether the legally enforced exclusion of information goods is better than taking no steps to
support their production; and, if copyright rules are desirable, determining their duration and
scope.
Influential historical contributions to this literature include the work of Plant,116 Hurt &
Schuchman,117 and Breyer.118 These works critiqued justifications of copyright cast in terms of
natural rights, and argued forcefully for a utilitarian evaluation of intellectual property privileges.
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See infra §III.C.2.
In analytical terms, this deadweight loss is the integral of the demand curve between marginal cost, and the price
at which the vendor chooses to sell.
In economic theory, any cost to society which could be relieved without harming anyone, may be described as a
deadweight loss. The particular sense I have described here appears in the literature on monopolies, and hence, in
the literature on copyright and patent law. To prevent confusion, I use the term solely in this sense.
114
Which, for digital information goods, is almost zero.
115
Which is, at least, the average price to recover the cost of producing the public good in the first place, but may be
more, depending on the structure of the market in question. See infra note 152 for further explanation on this point.
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Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA 167 (1934),
http://www.compilerpress.atfreeweb.com/Anno Plant Copyright.htm.
117
Robert M. Hurt and Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 51 AM. ECO. REV. 421
(1966), http://www.compilerpress.atfreeweb.com/Anno Hurt & Schuchman Econ Rationale Copyright.htm.
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See Breyer, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. Breyer's conclusions, in particular, were sufficiently
striking to provoke a response; see Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for
Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1971); but see Stephen Breyer, Copyright:
A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75 (1972).
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Their conclusion was generally that the case for copyright was particularly marginal, and that,
even if copyright should be maintained, its extent should be prudently constrained.119 Stallman
has provided a modern extension of these perspectives to the context of digital copyright.120
Although his position remains consequentialist, it has the interesting property of being couched
in terms of freedoms (both positive and negative), rather than the distribution of economic value.
It was only relatively recently that economists began constructing formal mathematical
models to evaluate the desirability of copyright laws. Although there was some earlier work
attempting to model the effects of piracy, the article by Landes & Posner has generally been
acknowledged as laying the foundations of a justification for copyright in terms of neoclassical
economics.121 Other authors, such as Koboldt122 and Watt123 have extended the approach taken
by Landes and Posner.
Ultimately, these studies have concluded that, while there are potentially problematic
costs associated with copyright, and while breadth and duration should be carefully constrained,
the need to provide authors and artists with incentives for their work creates a persistent need for
property rights in writing. This conclusion is not really surprising, since only the most
enthusiastic critics have maintained that the free rider problem does not discourage desirable
forms of authorship (such positions are only tenable amongst commentators who discard the
profit-seeking model of information producers which is ubiquitous in economic modeling).
What this strand of the literature has not achieved, is to contrast the enforced-exclusion
model, with the alternative of publicly funded provision.124 The more recent post-digital
literature is only beginning to address the issue. Watt's treatise on the economics of copyright,
for example, considers levies briefly, in the context of private copying,125 but rules public
funding out on account of distortionary effects of taxation, without considering any possible
benefits. Nadel, in the course of an economic critique of digital exclusive rights, points out that
119

See, e.g., Breyer, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 322, citing and concurring with Machlup's earlier
conclusion on the patent system, that whilst it would be foolish to abolish these systems, if they did not exist, it
would be foolish to create them; see Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, US Senate Judiciary
Committee, Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyright, Study no 15., (1958).
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Stallman, supra note 31.
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See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325
(1989).
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Christian Koboldt, Intellectual Property and Optimal Copyright Protection, 19 J. CULTURAL ECO. 131 (1995).
123
RICHARD WATT, COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY (2000).
124
Historically, scholars of copyright have occasionally mentioned the possibility of publicly funded provision, even
with approval; see, e.g., Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 118, at 424, 432. But it is unsurprising that the idea was not
taken very seriously before the widespread adoption of the Internet, because the case for rewards was, at that point,
much weaker; see, e.g., Breyer, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., note 104.
125
See Watt, supra note 123, at 132–4.
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public lending rights are an important alternative.126
A rigorous comparison between copyright and the alternatives may in a sense be more
difficult than evaluating copyright on its own, because it requires the weighting of overlapping
strengths and weaknesses in both sets of institutions.
Relevant recent discussions can be found in articles by Calandrillo127 and Ku.128
Calandrillo provides a broad comparison of ex post income-tax funded rewards against both the
copyright and patent systems.129 His paper identifies many of the important issues involved in
comparing copyright to rewards (to which I will return in Section III.C), but does not attempt to
construct a framework within which to weigh them. The article only briefly examines some the
more subtle potential weaknesses of rewards, such as the accuracy of the statistics the
government can collect; and although the article mentions distortions due to taxation,130 their
actual nature and peculiarities are not considered. To a significant extent, these limitations are an
inevitable result of attempting to consider patents and copyright in the same inquiry.
Ku argues that the primary purpose of the copyright system has been to provide
incentives for publication, rather than artistry, and that because of the structure of the music
industry, it is live performance and merchandising, rather than royalties, that reward artists.131 In
this picture, the recorded music industry offers artists publicity, but only in extreme cases does it
pay them money. Ku thus concludes that, if the Internet takes care of distribution, copyright
contributes nothing to artists. Furthermore, if musicians are still perceived to have insufficient
incentive for their work, they can be paid from a levy-based statutory license.
Although Ku's logic may be compelling, it does not constitute a generalized claim that
public funding is superior to digital copyright. It relies on anecdotal evidence to argue that, at
present, in the music industry, copyright serves principally as an incentive for publishers. In
order to draw watertight conclusions, it is necessary to compare public funding to a realistic
DRM system in which disintermediation (artists selling directly to the public) is to some extent
possible.
In the remainder of this section, I will present a structured argument that, in the context of
digital consumer information goods, where the comparison is between DRM and VMRS, it is
126

See Nadel, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 29–30.
Calandrillo, supra note 40.
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clearly possible for virtual markets to operate more efficiently.

B. Models to Compare DRM and Rewards?
1. Microeconomic Models with Asymmetrical Information
In some cases it is possible to construct simple economic models which tease out the
distinction between the operation of publicly funded reward systems and the use of exclusion
mechanisms as incentives. Examples include the work of Wright,132 or Shavell & van
Ypersele,133 who compare patents and rewards as incentives for invention. A central property of
these analyses is that they model the information asymmetry134 between potential inventors and
government; they can then compare the relative inefficiencies of imperfect information (in the
reward case) and deadweight loss (in the exclusion case).
It is not clear, however, that the same asymmetry of information applies in a virtual
market; if a culture of enthusiastic user participation arises, then VMRS should have no
significant, systematic, informational imperfections. If, on the other hand, technological or
sociological factors limit the degree of participation, informational inefficiencies will result, but
it is unlikely that they would have the same structure as those found in markets for inventions.
If we were to construct a single-information-good, microeconomic model of a virtual
market, we would observe that even if there is imperfection in the VMRS information collection
system, then to first order, this increases the risk of devoting resources to authorship and artistry,
but does not decrease the expected return (because an author may be just as likely to benefit from
strange voting cultures as to suffer from them).135 It is only when skewed voting patterns become
entrenched that social welfare suffers; this mode of failure is unambiguously cultural,136 and it is
unlikely that information-asymmetrical microeconomic models will shed much light on the issue.
But in any case, there are other, perhaps more important, questions that remain
unanswered by this kind of microeconomic analysis. If all citizens have equal numbers of votes
132

See Wright, supra note 36.
See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 40.
134
Note that the word “information” has two important and distinct meanings in this article. One is the relatively
straightforward meaning of data, stored on computers of various sorts, which might be of value — including
“information goods” such as digital music or writing. The other meaning, used here, is drawn from the economics
literature, to mean “information” possessed by consumers, producers, governments, or other economic actors, about
the value or costs of different actions, goods and services.
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Abramowitz reaches the same conclusion about patent prizes; see Abramowitz, supra note 36, at 123.
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One could also imagine incentive-compatibility failures in VMRS voting, but as I argued in Section II.B.2, these
can be addressed in the design of the system.
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in the VMRS, what effect will this have on market-driven cultural production? What are the true
costs for the technological infrastructure of both options? Are there perverse incentives or public
choice problems involved in the management of either system? How do the redistributive and
distortionary properties of taxation affect the desirability of different incentive structures for
information economies?
On some of these levels, the comparative economics of virtual markets and exclusive
rights is deeply tied to the particular distribution of wealth and preferences in particular societies;
one cannot employ the standard microeconomic technique of de-coupling these issues from
questions of resource allocation.137 In other cases, the analysis needs to consider explicitly
technical factors which are not normally included in economic models.

2. Theoretical Results in Mechanism Design
The question of how to design institutions and voting systems for the efficient production
of public goods is not new to economics; the term used for the field is mechanism design.
Whereas models like those discussed in the previous section make direct assumptions
about the quality and nature of information available to governments, the mechanism design
literature focuses on explicit messages or votes, which consumers can pass to governments. A
resource allocation mechanism specifies how much taxation should be raised from each citizen,
and how much of the public good should be produced, as a function of these messages.
Economists have examined a number of general properties of resource allocation
mechanisms138 — such as whether they are Pareto optimal,139 whether they are incentive
compatible — resulting in the honest disclosure of necessary information about individuals'
preferences (without which goods cannot be produced at optimal levels), or whether they satisfy
an individual rationality participation constraint — that is, whether all the participants in the
mechanism would be involved if they were given a choice about the matter.
Under many circumstances, there is an unavoidable tradeoff between these different
137

This approach is usually grounded in the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, mathematical results
showing that, under highly stylized conditions, markets always produce Pareto-optimal outcomes, and that any such
outcome can be produced by a market with the correct initial distribution of wealth. The real-world applicability of
these results is quite narrow, however; see JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, WHITHER SOCIALISM (1994); MICHAEL ALBERT AND
ROBERT HAHNEL, A QUIET REVOLUTION IN WELFARE ECONOMICS (1990).
138
For surveys of this literature, see DONALD E. CAMPBELL, RESOURCE ALLOCATION MECHANISMS (1987); Cornes
& Sandler, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., Chapter 7.
139
Pareto optimality indicates that no individual can be made better off without causing someone else to be worse
off. It is the predominant measure of efficiency used in the economics literature, although it does not address
important concerns about the equity of wealth distribution; see, e.g., Cornes & Sandler, supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined., at 220.
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properties,140 and as a result, there are no one-size-fits-all approaches to solving public good
allocation problems. It is thus not possible to simply invoke the mechanism design literature to
tell us whether virtual markets will perform better than DRM. Nevertheless, I will consider some
mechanism design results while examining aspects of the comparison more closely in Section
III.C.

3. Agent-based Computational Economics
An alternative approach which might be applied to modeling the differences between
VMRS and DRM is Agent-based Computational Economics, commonly abbreviated as ACE.
Rather than employing analytical mathematics to prove general results from assumptions about
general economic systems, ACE uses computers to simulate the behavior of instantiated
economies of agents, each of which is represented by a computer program.141
Generally speaking, ACE allows practitioners to explore aspects of the behavior of
economic systems which are beyond the reach of simple models. Although much of the literature
has focused on explaining emergent phenomena, there has also been some interest in exploring
the implications of different public policies on particular markets.
ACE may be relevant to problems in mechanism design, and particularly the comparison
of DRM with alternatives, because it provides tools for untangling the coupling between the
efficiency of resource allocation for production and the distribution of wealth and preferences.
We may claim, for example, that the deadweight loss of DRM is more severe than the
distortionary effects of a one-citizen, one-vote virtual market. The truth of this claim is
admittedly dependent upon the particular society about which the claim is made. ACE
approaches would allow us to hypothesize a large number of different distributions for wealth
and preferences, and to collect statistics about the robustness of our claims.
Furthermore, if this data is cross-referenced against real-world data, we can identify a
degree of certainty that our claims apply, not only to most hypothetical societies, but to actual
ones.
In order to construct an ACE model which elucidates the issues involved in comparing
virtual markets to DRM, we would need a number of components. Firstly, a hypothetical
140

For example, Roberts showed that if participants are well-informed and employ long term strategies, then Pareto
optimal resource allocation mechanisms will not produce honest preference disclosure; see Donald J. Roberts,
Incentives in planning procedures for the provision of public goods, 46 REV. ECO. STUD. 283 (1979).
141
See Leigh Tesfatsion, Agent-Based Computational Economics: Growing Economies from the Bottom Up, 8
ARTIFICIAL LIFE 55 (2002) for an overview of the ACE literature.
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population of individuals would be required; these individuals have varying amounts of personal
wealth.142 Their tastes for private goods, and for information goods generally, could also be
produced statistically.143
The aspect of information markets which is much harder to model is the relative value of
different hypothetical information goods, and the fact that demand for these goods is collectively
endogenous.144 To illustrate this, imagine a textbook on advanced quantum field theory. What is
the value of this good to particular consumers? The answer, of course, depends on whether they
have previously studied books on mathematics and introductory quantum mechanics. Although
the example may seem contrived, the same issue underlies much of the relative valuation of
information goods – be they literary, artistic, or purely educational; appreciation of both ideas
and expression depends inherently upon the framework of other ideas and experiences into
which they are placed.145
In order to ground the very abstract and indefinite questions of valuation for literary
works, for example, a reasonable model might categorize works along broad lines of originality,
dependency of ideas, and cultural relevance. An ACE analysis would depend heavily on results
which were stable across a wide range of these models. This modeling would probably form the
core of a successful application of computational economics to the comparison of VMRS and
DRM (The other important component being the collection and application of econometric data
to guide and verify the simulation parameters).
Any use of Agent-based Computational Economics is beyond the scope of this article.
But the technique seems to present a promising approach to difficult multi-dimensional problems
in the economics of copyright — and is perhaps deserving of further attention amongst
researchers seeking to obtain simultaneously nuanced and concrete evaluations of the impact of
intellectual property policy choices.
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Which can be created by a simple statistical model and cross-referenced against real data on the distribution of
wealth.
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Here, the issue of correction against econometric data is more complicated. Private/information good preferences,
as a function of wealth, can be identified from aggregate market statistics or through interviews; uncertainty in the
results can be handled by changing these variables across hypothetical economies.
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Literally, endogenous means originating from within; in this context, it means that notional demand for a good
depends on previous consumption of that good.
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See David Throsby, Production and Consumption of the Arts: A View of Cultural Economics, 32 J. ECO.
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(2002),
http://goanna.cs.rmit.edu.au/~ronvs/papers/ISMIR02.PDF. For an empirical study illustrating the endogeneity of
music preferences in particular, see Morris B. Holbrook and Robert M. Schindler, Some Exploratory Findings on the
Development of Music Tastes, 16 J. CONSUMER RES. 119 (1989).
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C. Economic Factors Affecting the Desirability of Virtual Markets
Attempts to make an accurate, formal and unified comparison between DRM and VMRS
are constrained significantly by the difficulty of modeling several complicating factors, which
must be counted as including: the role of actual wealth and preference distributions in
determining the efficiency of the compensation system;146 the degree to which different cultural
goods are substitutes for each other;147 the need to explicitly account for differences in the
technology involved;148 and the balance of cultural, rational and transaction cost influences on
who votes, and how, in a virtual market.
Nevertheless, it should be possible to say a great deal about the question. This section
will investigate the relative economic efficiency of virtual markets and DRM, while avoiding the
difficulty of explicitly coupling all of these issues together. I start by identifying the prominent
and distinct factors which could favor either set of institutions, and examining each in turn. After
analyzing the role of these effects, we will be in a stronger position to evaluate the truth,
magnitude and certainty of the claim that virtual markets present an advantageous policy
position.
The considerations which I identify as being the central aspects of the economic
comparison between the two alternative systems, are as follows:149
•

The cost of artificial scarcity (or “deadweight loss”) caused by exclusive rights.

•

The relative cost of the technological infrastructure required for each system to operate.

•

The relative size of transaction costs associated with rights clearance and royalty payments.

•

The distortionary effects of VMRS taxes or levies upon the work and consumption choices of
taxpayers.
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See infra text accompanying nn 158–160.
See infra nn 151–152.
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See infra §III.C.2.
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This arrangement of distinct economic factors cannot claim to be canonical. When attempting to compare sets of
hypothetical alternative institutions, which differ in myriad intricate ways, there are inevitably divergent formulae
for decomposing the important distinctions between them. Cases could probably be made for rearranging some of
the specific matters I discuss in the following sections, but such changes are unlikely to affect the nature of the
argument.
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•

The nature and quality of the information each institution uses, implicitly or explicitly, about
the value of each cultural work, to reward that work's creator.
I devote a section to discussing each of these sets of issues.

1. The Cost of Artificial Scarcity
Once a copyright work has been created, there is a group of people who would value
copies of it, enough to cover its marginal cost, but not to the extent that they will purchase the
good at the price set by the copyright owner. These lost opportunities for distribution are called a
deadweight loss.150 It is the principal cost of enforcing scarcity in a good which is otherwise
available in abundance. Alternative compensation systems are able to avoid this downside of
exclusive rights. But how substantial is that advantage?
Markets which depend on copyright are in practice constructed from a ubiquitous web of
monopolies. While prices are sometimes affected by competition between substitutes,151 the
essential character of monopoly pricing perseveres.152 Deadweight loss is always likely to be
present, although to varying extents and with varying degrees of significance. There is evidence
that artificial scarcity effects a very significant reduction in the distribution of music.153 In the
longer term, deadweight loss for some kinds of writing could be even higher. Since writing is
perhaps the most important tool for education and knowledge distribution, the exclusion of
writing creates huge costs, particularly in developing nations.154
150

See supra note 113 for a formal microeconomic definition of deadweight loss.
Substitutability refers to the fact that consuming one good may reduce the desire for (or the benefit which can be
obtained from) another. As others have argued, the extent of substitutability in various information markets is poorly
understood, and deserving of further empirical research; see, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New
Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management”, 97 MICH. L. REV.
462, 520–2 (1998),
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/jec/Lochner.pdf. While some economic models have attempted to capture
substitutability for culture, they are, of necessity, heavily stylized; see, e.g., Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of
Superstars, 71 AM. ECO. REV. 845, 847–8 (1981).
152
This is quite a subtle point. To understand the situation completely, it is necessary to realize that there are two
levels at which competition can occur in information markets. There is competition amongst information creators, to
produce novel ideas and modes of expression first (since the reputational and market share benefits of marketing
these first can be large). Then there is competition in the distribution of particular expressive works, where copyright
creates a monopoly. This is the monopoly which is partially overcome by substitution, but reputation effects and
artists' varied talents combine to seriously constrain substitutability in many cases.
The monopoly effects created directly by copyright are thus distinct from other consequences of market power in
entertainment industries (see, e.g., In Re: Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litigation, MDL
Docket No. 1361 (D. Maine) http://www.musiccdsettlement.com/english/finaljudgmentorder.pdf), which can limit
competition between substitutes. That market power is likely to arise naturally from the fixed costs and barriers to
entry into distribution and marketing systems, and is only marginally increased by copyright per se (through rights
clearance costs, for example).
153
See infra nn 162–165 and accompanying text.
154
See, e.g., Alan Story, Study on Intellectual Property Rights, the Internet, and Copyright, U.K. Commission on
151

43

Many advocates of strong copyright rules argue that deadweight losses are overcome by
price discrimination,155 or, in extreme cases, that they do not really exist.156 The idea is that
publishers have an incentive to minimize deadweight loss by producing cheap versions of their
works to appropriate the extra demand at the bottom end of the market. The price discrimination
theory is thoroughly critiqued elsewhere,157 but I provide a brief treatment of some of the issues
here.
One potential disadvantage of market structures involving price discrimination is that
those with high demand, who might have had the good more cheaply, are forced to pay more for
it, thereby reducing consumer surplus.158 Another is that some kinds of versioning will involve
deliberate degradation of the good in order to (negatively) differentiate the cheaper version.
But there is a more subtle and important problem with depending on price discrimination
to minimize or prevent deadweight loss, which is frequently left unconsidered in economic
analyses. The symptom is that rights holders systematically discriminate at prices that are too
high. The root cause is the fact that the area beneath the demand curve does not capture the true
utilitarian scope of deadweight loss, particularly in situations of intra-national or international
inequity.
This deadweight loss amplification occurs because of the difference between notional and
financial demand. In the high-value range, demand from wealthy consumers will cause market
forces to overstate the benefits of works to wealthy consumers. People who have almost no
income, on the other hand, are incapable of expressing financial demand for a good. As a
consequence, there is disproportionately little incentive for the producer to cater to this “market
Intellectual
Property
Rights,
Study
Paper
no.
5,
(2002)
§
4,
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/study_papers/sp5_story_study.pdf.
155
Price discrimination is said to occur when the producer of the good creates several versions, and sells those at
different prices to consumers with different levels of demand. Alternatively, inter-temporal price discrimination can
occur when the producer lowers the price over time, selling to high-valuing consumers first and to lower-valuing
consumers at later dates.
156
See, for example Easterbrook, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 112. Justice Easterbrook seems to
claim that because information is sometimes distributed freely, we might conclude that “when free distribution is
socially optimal, people will not enforce their property right to withhold publication or demand fees”. No
explanation is offered as to why rights holders will, in general, seek socially optimal outcomes. This is a pressing
question, because under copyright, attempts to eliminate deadweight loss will often undermine rights holders'
revenues.
157
See Cohen, supra note 151; James Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and
Digital
Intellectual
Property,
53
VAND.
L.
REV.
2007
(2000),
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/Law/lawreview/vol536/boyle.pdf.
158
This is an old-fashioned example of the dependence of social welfare outcomes upon the initial distribution of
wealth (cf. supra note 137). One might believe that dollars in the hands of consumers will produce more benefit than
dollars in the hands of record industry executives and shareholders; alternately, one might believe that dollars in the
hands of artists will do more good than dollars in the hands of the public at large. Where the dollars are needed
most, and who actually ends up with them, is an empirical question well beyond the scope of this paper.
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segment”, even with price discrimination.

Figure 1: Financial Deadweight Loss

The situation is illustrated in the contrast between Figure 1, which shows financial
deadweight loss159 in a market for an excluded, non-rivalrous good with realistically effective
price discrimination, and Figure 2, which illustrates utilitarian deadweight loss in the same
market. Exemplary instances are abundant: there is little direct incentive for a textbook publisher
to distribute cost-price textbooks to those who cannot otherwise afford them, little incentive for
record companies to give teenagers with minimal pocket money free or cheap access to all of the
music they would like, and (embarrassment aside) little incentive for pharmaceutical firms to
allow cost-price distribution of drugs to impoverished nations.
Ideally, if a welfare system was acting to redistribute wealth to those “devalued” by the
demand curve, then price discrimination could be expected to reasonably constrain deadweight
loss. But in practice, because this tends not to occur, employing exclusive institutions to finance
information production will exacerbate the problem.160
159

Figure 1 illustrates a Marshallian measure of deadweight loss, but the income-related effect in question is not an
ordinary “income effect” and would not be quantified by considering Hicksian demand. Rather, they involve interpersonal utility comparisons and presuppose a utilitarian social welfare function.
160
For example, when the United States employed the threat of trade sanctions to persuade developing nations to
enact strong copyright and patent laws, and ultimately to sign the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) (see Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.,
chapter 7), it did not consider combining this with aid packages to correct the billions of dollars of inequitable
wealth redistribution that TRIPs might cause.
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Figure 2: Utilitarian Deadweight Loss

Such structural considerations give us reason to believe that the costs of artificial scarcity
are likely to be large, and weigh heavily in favor of alternative compensation systems. But how
large is large? Two examples may serve to illustrate the scope for deadweight loss in copyright
markets: one is the retail price of CDs, which provides some information about the scale of price
discrimination employed by rights holders; another is the ratio of pirated music files to licensed
music sales, which is related to the number of copies proscribed by copyright. Unfortunately,
these examples do not allow a complete quantification of the cost of artificial scarcity, because
we cannot calculate the financial, let alone utilitarian, implications of these lost opportunities161
— but they do allow us to glimpse the order of magnitude of the bottom line.
Consider the case of compact disc sales. Although temporal price discrimination is visible
in CD markets, where older CDs are sold at discounted prices, these prices rarely fall close to the
marginal cost of distribution (at least in first world markets); the price of most CDs never falls
below 200–400% of marginal cost, even in the presence of inter-temporal price discrimination.162
While price discrimination is trimming at the edges of artificial scarcity, it is leaving the core of
161

Cf. Richard Watt, The Past and Future of the Economics of Copyright, 1 REV. ECO. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES
151, § 3.1 (2004) (emphasizing the lack of data on demand curves as the primary hurdle for the development of
economic understandings of copyright).
162
Anecdotal observation of the Australian market would suggest that a mass-market CD may sell in the range of
AUD $20–$30; discounted older or fringe CDs sell for AUD $10–$20, while a bootlegged or “unauthorized” CD
can sell for as little as $5.
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deadweight loss intact.
Volumetric data on piracy give us some insight into the amount of distribution which
may be encompassed by deadweight loss. Since the CD prices discussed above were observed in
Australia, I will continue to use that market as an illustrative example, comparable in size and
composition to one of the larger, urbanized U.S. states. Survey data indicates that last year,
approximately 770 million songs were reproduced and distributed without authorization from
copyright holders; 430 million over file sharing networks, and 340 million with CD burners.163 In
2003, a record-breaking year, Australians purchased about 677 million legal songs.164 So in this
market, piracy now accounts for more than 50% of music distribution.165
The connection between these piracy levels and deadweight losses is not entirely
straightforward. Firstly, for the present normative comparison of VMRS and DRM, I will make
the simplifying assumption that an effective DRM system will prevent the great majority of
pirate distribution.166 In that case, the number of copies encompassed by deadweight loss is equal
to the number of pirated copies, minus the number which would be replaced by purchased copies
(if consumers lost the option to pirate),167 plus the number of additional copies which would be
made today, excepting that many consumers do not make copies because it is illegal or
inconvenient due to illegality. Clearly, the number of copies which are prevented by copyright, is
comparable to, and quite possibly larger than, the number of copies which it allows.
Data is not available to tell us, precisely, the relative value of these two sets of copies. It

163

These figures come from a study commissioned by the Australian Record Industry Association (ARIA); see
Quantum Market Research, Understanding CD Burning and Internet File Sharing and its Impact on the Australian
Music Industry, at http://www.aria.com.au/documents/AriaIllegalMusicResearchReport_Summary.pdf. 11% usage
amongst 16.6 million Australians aged 10+: 1.83 million downloaders × 19.6 average files per month × 12 months =
430 million songs downloaded. 40% of 16.6 million people received copied CDs: 6.64 million CD recipients × 3.9
average CDs per year × 13 songs per CD = 337 million songs on copied CDs.
164
From ARIA's 2003 sales figures (http://www.aria.com.au/news/stats2000.htm): 50.6 million albums × 13 songs
per CD + 9.5 million singles × 2 songs per CD = 677 million songs sold on CD. There were no licensed music
download services operating in Australia at the time.
165
53%, according to these approximate figures.
166
This may not be the case for all imaginable scenarios in which DRM plays a prominent role, but the fact that
illegal copyright infringements may make DRM-based copyright marketplaces more efficient is not a point
acknowledged by DRM advocates, so I am going to place it aside for the time being.
167
On the size of this switch, see Felix Oberholzer and Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record
Sales:
An
Empirical
Analysis,
Draft
working
paper,
Mar.
2004,
at
http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing_March2004.pdf (suggesting that it might negligible or even
negative); Eric Boorstin, Music Sales in the Age of File Sharing, Senior Thesis, Princeton Univ., (2004), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/~eboorsti/thesis/Music Sales in the Age of File Sharing.pdf; but see Stan J. Liebowitz,
Pitfalls in Measuring the Impact of File Sharing, (2004), at http://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/intprop/pitfalls.pdf
(surveying and critiquing empirical studies on the effect of file sharing on music sales, including those by
Oberholzer & Strumpf and Boorstin, and concluding that at this stage, we should still expect that file sharing is at
least partly responsible for the recent decline in U.S. record sales).

47

is certainly reasonable to assume that copies sold will on average be valued more highly than
those which are preempted by artificial scarcity; consumers will of course purchase more valued
works even at higher prices, though there are effects relating to both inequality168 and imperfect
information169 which mitigate against this pattern of organization. We can, however, employ a
conservative assumption to obtain a lower bound on financial deadweight loss, which is, that
consumer valuations are uniformly distributed beneath the lowest available price.170 In that case,
an estimate of deadweight loss in Australia, under effective DRM, would be 75 Australian
cents,171 times the number of works affected, which is about 770 million songs per year. Thus,
financial deadweight losses from music copyright in Australia would be, both roughly and
conservatively, $AUD 500 million ($350–375 million) per year. Per GDP, the equivalent cost in
the United States would be a little over 7 billion dollars per year.172 These costs are of course
rough estimates,173 and they only cover music, and not other forms of copyright subject matter.
I have argued that the deadweight losses associated with DRM-enforced copyright may
be very high. It is not possible to create artificial scarcity for information goods, without
incurring problematic costs for society. From this perspective, the virtual market alternative
would provide substantial efficiency gains.

2. Technological Infrastructure Costs
Both the VMRS and DRM models for information markets require computational
infrastructure. For a virtual market, it is the voting system, and a means to pass rewards on to
artists and publishers. Technologically enforced copyright depends upon several components: a
network of trusted systems (in order for the public's use of information goods to be controlled,
each device that has access to the underlying digital works must be “trusted” by rights
holders),174 as well as cryptographic channels to ensure that copies cannot be captured en route
168

See supra nn 158–160 and accompanying text.
See infra § III.C.5.
170
Or, equivalently, that demand is linear beneath this point.
171
Due to the uniform distribution assumption, this is half the typical lowest price — ½ × AUD $20 being $10, per
album or about AU 75 cents per track. This rate is more or less equivalent to the “lowest available price” for most
songs being U.S. $1, the amount charged by iTunes.
172
According to the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (2004), the U.S. GDP is 10.98 trillion dollars, while Australia's is 570
billion.
173
See especially supra note 167 and accompanying text (causes for both uncertainty and conservatism in the
estimate).
174
On the necessary role of trusted systems in making DRM an economic possibility, see, for example, Stefik, supra
note Error! Bookmark not defined.; Stuart E. Schechter et al., Trusted Computing Peer-To-Peer Distribution, and
the Economics of Pirated Entertainment, in PROC. 2ND ANNUAL WORKSHOP ON ECONOMICS AND INFORMATION
SECURITY, §1–2 http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~stuart/papers/eis03.pdf (2003); Ryan Roemer, Locking Down Loose
169
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to those trusted systems, mechanisms to approve particular reproductions and uses of works, and
the means to pursue “leaks” in the system and prosecute infringers.175 The relative cost of these
two alternative infrastructures is an important factor in determining which policy scheme is more
desirable.
The cost of a VMRS infrastructure is significant, including the secure hardware to certify
downloads or votes,176 the development of software to administer the system and possibly the
maintenance of servers to ensure that cultural material is openly accessible. Note that the cost of
the actual rewards is not part of this overhead. One component of a DRM system carries a set of
costs of a nature and magnitude similar to those of VMRS. These include the servers,
authentication mechanisms and rights clearance systems required by technologically-mediated
copyright. However large these costs are, because they are likely to remain quite symmetrical
across the two alternative systems, their normative consequences are limited.
But there are other, much larger technological overheads associated with enforcing digital
exclusive rights.

The most significant costs in DRM infrastructure relate to the extreme

difficulty of designing and maintaining these systems so as to be secure. Kelsey & Schneier,
amongst others, have emphasized that any digital trusted system must have analogue outputs;177
even if the digital links are secure, high-quality digitizations (of music, at any rate) will be easy
to obtain.178 But, as I will explain, even the “digital” part of a DRM network is likely to suffer
from serious and persistent security problems.
Because a single point of failure can cause the collapse of an entire DRM network,

Bits: Trusted Computing, Digital Rights Management and the Fight for Copyright Control on Your Computer, 8
UCLA J.L. TECH. §II, at http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2003/08_040223_roemer.php (2003).
175
Attempts to reduce loss through leaks would be greatly assisted by secure digital watermarks (which allow a
pirated file to be linked back to the user who purchased the original), but considerable research efforts are yet to
produce a robust “traitor tracing” algorithm which operates on public networks such as the Internet. In the absence
of watermarking, leaks must be traced using traditional police investigations — a strategy which is likely to prove
hopeless.
Even if secure watermarks were implementable, leaks would still occur (because the content of stolen computers
and/or files could be “liberated” without traceability); but in this much smaller set of cases, criminal investigations
might have some effect.
176
See supra §II.B.1 .
177
Kelsey & Schneier, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
178
The Motion Picture Association of America has proposed that all analogue-to-digital converters (ADCs) be
regulated, to require that they recognize and refuse to digitize material which carries a standardized watermark; see
MPAA, Motion Picture Association of America, Content Protection Status Report, Filed with the US Senate
Judiciary Committee, (2002), at http://judiciary.senate.gov/special/content_protection.pdf. From an engineering
perspective, this is a very radical proposal, because ADCs are a fundamental building block for electrical systems,
and watermark detection circuitry is much more complicated than an ADC itself. It is not clear at this stage that such
a proposal is deserving of serious cost and feasibility studies.
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millions of consumer devices need to be virtually tamper-proof.179 This degree of security is a
costly proposition, to say the least; but just how costly is difficult to say without having achieved
it.180 Informally, many security professionals have claimed that it is sufficiently difficult to be
considered impossible. There has, however, been some technical progress on tamper-resistance,
and a number of approaches can be used to predict a possible price tag. Extrapolation from the
price of existing hardware gives a figure in the range of U.S. $20–$150 per consumer device.181
A more ambitious back-of-the-envelope calculation can attempt to account for a wider
range of possible weaknesses by inferring costs from other areas of IT security. I tried this, and it
resulted in a remarkably coincidental figure — $150 per device.182 These rough estimates of the
179

Designing consumer devices which are literally tamper proof is almost certainly impractical, if not impossible; see
Ross Anderson and Markus Kuhn, Tamper Resistance - a Cautionary Note, in PROC. 2ND USENIX WORKSHOP ON
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1996), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/tamper.html. Instead, the degree of tamper
resistance must be so high that only attackers with substantial resources can succeed — and, as Anderson & Kuhn
went on to demonstrate, even this will be very challenging. See Ross Anderson and Markus Kuhn, Low-cost attacks
on Tamper Resistant Devices, in PROC. 5TH INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP IN SECURITY PROTOCOLS, 125 (1997),
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/tamper2.pdf. In addition, large amounts of information must remain enclosed
when security compromises do occur, and every significant instance of tampering must be traceable before it inflicts
massive economic damage.
180
See BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS & LIES: DIGITAL SECURITY IN A NETWORKED WORLD Chapter 14 (2000).
181
This approach begins by considering state-of-the-art tamper resistant devices for financial cryptography. The IBM
4758 co-processor is an example of an extremely sophisticated “trusted” hardware platform; see Sean W. Smith and
Steve Weingart, Building a High-Performance, Programmable Secure Coprocessor, 31 COMPUTER NETWORKS 831
(1999), http://www.research.ibm.com/secure_systems/papers/arch.pdf. The security features of the 4758 would
stand a reasonable chance of preventing serious economic damage due to digital content leakage — although in
deployment it is not necessarily immune to software flaws; see Richard Clayton and Mike Bond, Experience Using
a Low-Cost FPGA Design to Crack DES Keys, in PROC. WORKSHOP ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC HARDWARE AND
EMBEDDED SYSTEMS. (2002), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/descrack/DEScracker.html. The 4758 currently sells
for around USD $4000 in a relatively small market; there are only about 300,000 ATMs in the United States, for
example (see Terminals Online, 19 BANK NETWORK NEWS 4 (2000) ).
Unofficial estimates undertaken at IBM's Thomas J. Watson Research Center (obtained by personal
communication), indicate that the 4758 itself, even in very large volumes, would still cost over USD $500. A
miniaturized version would probably cost $100–$150. It might be conceivable to get as low as $20 or $30 if a
single-chip equivalent device could be designed (although this would require significant research and development).
Even with the most optimistic figures, this kind of hardware would represent a very sizeable tax if it was required in
all consumer media devices.
182
A recent survey of 503 organizations' experience in dealing with computer crime indicated that a total of USD
$375.6 million was lost annually in incidents of a kind which might be applicable to a DRM network. See Richard
Power, CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, 8 COMPUTER SECURITY ISSUES & TRENDS, at 10–1 (2002),
http://www.gocsi.com/press/20020407.html (this excludes losses from “insider abuse of Net access”, laptop theft
and denial-of-service attacks). These measurable losses were spread over 44% of the population surveyed,
amounting to $1.7 million per organization affected. The importance of these loss figures is that they provide some
indicative lower bound for the price of achieving security; if effective protection is cheaper than the expected losses
due to security breaches, then most organizations will quickly deploy it.
Conservatively (adopting the lower bound), effective security for a controlled corporate network costs between
$750,000 (average measured losses per organization) and $1.7 million (average loss for organizations which
measure their losses). The cost for a device in a consumer's home might in some respects be higher (since these
locations are not controlled by rights holders) and in other respects may be much lower (because some security risks
scale with the number of computers/users on the network). The weakest assumption is that costs per device are the
same as costs per employee. The average number of employees for the organizations in the survey was about 5000
(from the table in Power, id., at 3; assuming median numbers for each interval, and 15,000 employees for
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price of effective copyright protection are, of course, very rough. But they accurately reflect the
kinds of expenses necessary to avoid “competing with free”. A DRM network is only as strong
as its weakest link. In order to prevent break-in at a few unknown but crucial points, extreme
precautions must be taken everywhere. This is a fundamental problem of digital copyright, which
I have attempted to illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Information flows in a DRM system

It is helpful to compare this problem to the task of securing VMRS. Both DRM and
VMRS networks contain security-critical points of failure. In a DRM regime, these are all the
devices in users' homes (illustrated in Figure 3). In a virtual market, the only security-critical
systems are the handful of government-run computers which allocate the rewards (as shown in
Figure 4). Consumers participate in VMRS voluntarily, because it is overwhelmingly in their
interest, and no actions taken by a small group of conspirators can threaten the network as a
whole.
There may be another fundamental reason why the costs of security in DRM are much
greater than in VMRS. Every stable, successful digital network ever built, has operated on an
unstated principle — the vast majority of participants want the network to function. The Internet
is, of course, the most striking example of this phenomenon. Participants attach computers to the
Internet, and those computers execute code which is generally compliant with a set of agreed

organizations in the 10,000+ category). Hence, if we divide the minimum organizational cost of close-to-bulletproof
security ($750,000), by the number of employees per organization (5000), we obtain a ballpark conservative
prediction of effective security costs for an embedded consumer device: $150.
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standards for communication. Even a small proportion of defecting nodes which attempt to
subvert this arrangement can cause serious network problems.183

Figure 4: Information flows in a virtual market

A DRM network cannot expect cooperative behavior from its participants. As peer-topeer file sharing has demonstrated, many users are eager to exchange copyrighted information,
with disregard to publishers' and authors' legal privileges. Whilst most of these actors will not
have the skill to write software which attempts to redefine the network, they would be more than
willing to download and run it. Designing a network which functions whilst most of its
participants attempt to cause its downfall is a problematic and expensive proposition.
As a result of the very high costs of DRM security, it is safe to conclude that the
infrastructure costs involved in enforcing digital copyright will be much higher than those
associated with virtual markets.

183

The work of Nisan and Ronen has sparked a growing literature on incentive-compatible network protocols, but
this literature does not consider the more complicated question of enforcing participation in an intrinsically
unpopular protocol. See Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, in PROC. 31ST ACM
SYMPOSIUM ON THE THEORY OF COMPUTING, 129 (1999), citeseer.nj.nec.com/nisan99algorithmic.html.
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3. Rights Clearance Transaction Costs
A virtual market allows open access to a huge body of works by default, and then
organizes remuneration for those works in retrospect. DRM, in contrast, prohibits most forms of
access until appropriate rights have been licensed to the user. This distinction may give rise to
systematic differences in the effort which parties must expend in order to agree upon license
terms.
On the distribution side, the need to formally clear all of the rights required for the use of
a work is not a huge problem in most situations.184 A majority of users will fit neatly into one of
a few categories; their terms of access can easily be codified, and licensing occurs automatically
with each purchase.
There, are however, a number of use cases for which rights clearance is inherently a
major problem. Particularly, these relate to indexing, search, and analysis tools which operate
over large collections of works. It is only when primary materials are available in open
information ecosystems that competition can freely drive the development of the most usable and
sophisticated “value added” search services. Due to the operation of what is effectively
“implied” or “opt-out” licensing, Web-based tools have been able to avoid transaction cost
problem

—

perhaps

the

two

most

noteworthy

examples

are

Google™,185

and

CiteSeer/ResearchIndex.186 The majority of humanity's art, culture and wisdom is not on the
web, however, and so does not fall within the scope of this peculiar solution.
In some cases, the barriers which exclusive rights pose to large-scale indexing and
analysis services may be overcome, either by limitations and exceptions to copyright,187 or by
collective licensing. But solutions based in fair use are inherently limited and uncertain, while
licensed solutions will often need to prohibit or restrict many features of existing search tools.
Any search facility which provides information about the context of results (as Google does with
184
Distribution-side rights clearance is of course very different to production-side rights clearance. Identifying
exactly who owns the various rights applicable to a particular work, in order for them to be paid for a performance
or derivative work (by a collecting society, a firm running a DRM system, or a VMRS administration) may
sometimes be difficult, but these costs apply equally to exclusive rights based and alternative compensation systems.
185
http://google.com; seealso Sergey Brin and Lawrence Page, The anatomy of a large-scale hypertextual Web
search
engine,
30
COMPUTER NETWORKS &
ISDN
SYSTEMS
107
(1998),
http://wwwdb.stanford.edu/pub/papers/google.pdf.
186
CiteSeer was originally developed in NEC's research laboratories, though it is now operated by Pennsylvania
State University; see http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu; seealso C. Lee Giles et al., CiteSeer: An Automatic Citation Indexing
System, in Ian Witten et al., eds., 3RD ACM CONFERENCE ON DIGITAL LIBRARIES, 89 (1998),
http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/giles98citeseer.html.
187
See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that making cached “thumbnail” copies of
images, in order to provide them as search results, constituted fair use)
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search terms, and CiteSeer does with citations) is also providing parts of the actual text of the
document. It is a relatively straightforward process to write software which combines these
snippets of text, recreating the entire original document.188 Preventing these forms of revelation
(for example, by attempting to track the users of search facilities) may be possible, but is likely
to be costly.
There is some clear evidence that transaction costs are holding back the development of
extremely valuable information services. As a relatively small example, the features of research
tools such as CiteSeer and ArXiv (which index freely available papers, primarily in computer
science and physics respectively) often go well beyond those of proprietary databases that index
copyrighted research material,189 but they cannot extend those benefits to the entire corpus of
scholarly literature, because it is largely owned by the proprietary competitors.
A more striking example is the retarded development of searchable full text databases of
ordinary books. Despite their remarkable utility, these services have only started to appear in the
last year190; clearing rights for them is a daunting task, and many of the most valuable works are
likely to be excluded for precisely the reasons discussed above.191
The indexing, search and analysis cases in which rights clearance is a problem for digital
copyright appear to be an instance of the “tragedy of the anticommons”,192 in which too many
overlapping property rights render beneficial projects inconveniently or prohibitively expensive
— though on a scale which is perhaps less systematic than that which can occur under other
intellectual property regimes.193 This problem for DRM systems is not insurmountable, but
188

See infra n 191 for an example of the consequences of this concern.
Such as Thomson ISI's Web of Knowledge®, Thomson West's Westlaw®, or Reed Elsevier's LexisNexis™.
Because proprietary databases are the only viable option in many areas, researchers in those fields may not have
compared their performance to services like CiteSeer. Admittedly, the comparison between research services is also
complicated by the role of patented algorithms (see, for example, U.S. patents #5,265,065; #5,794,236; #6,285,999
and #6,289,342), and the significant amount of human labor involved in some of these databases (the Web of
Knowledge includes manually indexed citations, while Westlaw's KeyCite™depends upon manual categorization of
legal material).
190
See
Gary
Wolf,
The
Great
Library
of
Amazonia,
11.12
WIRED
MAG.
(2003),
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.12/amazon_pr.html; Stephanie Olsen, Google tests book search, CNet
News, Dec. 17, 2003, at http://news.com.com/2100-1038_3-5128515.html.
191
See, e.g., The Authors Guild, Amazon's New Database Likely to Help Sales of Some Works, May Undermine
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neither is it insignificant. Virtual markets and similar alternative compensation systems do not
suffer from it, and so we have reason to believe that the transaction costs associated with DRM
will be higher than those associated with alternatives.

4. The Implications and Side-Effects of Taxation
One common objection to virtual markets might be expressed as “why should I pay taxes
for music I don't listen to (or writing I don't read)”; another, inverse, objection is “what if I
would pay a lot for something, but VMRS limits how much power my wallet carries?”
These objections result from the fact that virtual markets reveal the pure public-good
nature of information. Similar objections can be made by pacifists, outraged that their tax dollars
go to the military, or by libertarians who wish to reduce public funding for academic research.
There are also elements of disanalogy, because in a virtual market, each taxpayer gets to
pick which public goods they want their taxation to fund. It is only people who dislike
information goods of all sorts, who will be worse off with VMRS — and even then, only if the
funds are drawn from income tax, rather than levies on appropriate devices. Fundamentally, the
extent to which these effects will be present depends on how the taxation for the virtual market is
raised.
Nevertheless, there may be some advantage to the DRM model because it guarantees that
people are paying precisely for the things they want. They have significant control over the
magnitude, and some control over the allocation,194 of their contributions. The relevant question
is — how large is the advantage which can be obtained through direct payment, rather than
voting for the creation of information goods?
There are a number of results in the mechanism design literature which concern the
efficiency of voting schemes for producing public goods.
Bowen showed that if majority voting195 is employed to decide the level of taxationfunded provision of a single public good, then, under strict but not implausible assumptions, the
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); Jerome H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzuu:
Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1742 (2000) (advocating liability-rule regimes
as an alternative to creeping exclusive rights which are likely to give rise to anticommons effects).
194
Consumers' control over allocation has some significant limitations, because they must “take or leave” each good
at a price set by the distributor. In a virtual market, they receive a fixed number of free votes; in a copyright
marketplace, they have a variable number of constrained votes.
195
Majority voting refers to finding an outcome such that it will win a two-choice election against any other
alternative. It is easy to show that if there is a single parameter to be chosen, and each voter's preferences are singlepeaked, then the median vote will command a majority; see Howard Bowen, The Interpretation of Voting in the
Allocation of Economic Resources, 58 Q. J. ECO. 27 (1943).
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result will be Pareto optimal.196 Under the conditions which Bowen modeled there are no
problematic “one user, one vote” effects.
It turns out that the biggest problem with applying Bowen's result to a virtual market is
the “single public good” assumption. Although it is tempting to regard existing public sector
institutions as fixed, and propose VMRS as a single public good which should be regulated by a
single stand-alone plebiscite, it is not correct to do so.
A virtual market provides incentives for the creation of a bundle of distinct public goods,
and individuals' preferences will be widely distributed within the space of possible tastes.
Existentialist fiction, hyperactive cartoons, and soufflé recipes must be regarded as separate
public goods.
Unfortunately, the results suggesting the optimality of median voting only apply to an
economy with one public good. Once several are present, there is no guarantee that voting by a
community with heterogeneous preferences will provide a stable, optimal outcome. Indeed,
Bucovetsky has shown that a majority equilibrium exists only if the many-dimensional space of
public good preferences can be reduced to two taste variables.197
Bucovetsky's result seems to guarantee that a virtual market could not be optimal,
because it will inevitably face a population with highly heterogeneous and complicated tastes.
There is, however, cause for optimism if we move away from a majority-voting model and
replace it with an incremental approach.
De Trenqualye has shown that if cost sharing (tax) rules are fixed in advance, then an
incremental voting system, which adjusts the budget allocations to many different public goods
in a continuous fashion, will reach a Pareto-optimal equilibrium.198 This model has some
significant similarities to the virtual market proposal.199
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In Bowen's model, taste for public and private goods are independent, each individual pays an equal share of the
cost of producing the public good, and preferences are assumed to be normally distributed. This result is generalized
in Cornes & Sandler, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 205–10, where it is shown that majority voting
can be Pareto optimal whenever individual variation in preferences for the public good are independent of
consumption of private commodities, using a more general Lindahl taxation formula which combines lump-sum and
fixed-rate income taxation. Also, the requirement for bell-curve preferences is relaxed to include any symmetrical
preference distribution.
197
Sam Bucovetsky, Choosing Tax Rates and Expenditure Levels Using Majority Rule, 46 J. PUB. ECO. 113 (1991).
198
See Pierre de Trenquayle, An extension of Bowen's dynamic voting rule to many dimensions, 15 SOC. CHOICE &
WELFARE 141 (1997). De Trenqualye's model assumes voters make decisions based on their immediate preferences;
Pareto optimality at equilibrium and local incentive compatibility depend on convex preferences; the existence and
inevitability of equilibrium depends on Euclidean preferences.
199
The largest difference is that De Trenqualye's model is completely dynamic, adjusting the previous budget at each
increment. The virtual market is a static rule, but it produces persistent public goods - once written, a book stays
written. Limitations in this interpretation may arise through the evolution of people's preferences; the value of many
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This very encouraging result is not quite the end of the story, though. The problem lies
within the assumption of fixed tax-sharing rules. It is true that, for any given tax formula, VMRS
will work well, and may approach Pareto optimality. But we are, at the same time, returned to
the question of whether there is a tax formula which is as good as the DRM-based copyright
marketplace.
Any tax formula used to fund public goods can be decomposed into a component which
is “benefit offsetting” (citizens are left indifferent after the introduction of the tax and the
creation of the public good), and a component which is both distortionary and redistributive.200
An ideal tax system must both fund public goods which pass a cost-benefit test, and perform
redistribution which is “socially desirable”, although this objective is inevitably subjective.
Some plausible funding schemes for VMRS were introduced in Section II.B.3. Each is
likely to entail some redistributionary and some distortionary effects. The significance of those
effects, however, depends both upon the choice of social welfare function, and on the particular
society under consideration.
A market constructed from exclusive rights raises funds quite efficiently. Its limitations
are intimately related to the operation of price discrimination techniques. If price discrimination
under DRM is imperfect (and it always is, to some extent), it may create inefficient distortionary
incentives for consumers to expend resources “circumventing” price discrimination. There will
also be distortionary/redistributive consequences where publishers of information goods possess
market power.201
Virtual markets will have redistributive/distortionary effects determined largely by the
chosen taxation model.202 So, for example, using income taxation to fund artistic and literary
production will have side-effects unless the incidence of that particular tax offsets the benefits.
Also, because valuations of information goods will not be homogeneous within each tax bracket,

cultural works might be more accurately modelled with exponential decay than with constant value.
We can interpret the ratio of each user's votes (for different works) as defining a line in N, where N is the number of
different information goods which can be chosen (note that this space could probably be compressed into a lowerdimensional “taste space”). Then if users are given a way of choosing how much revenue should be allocated to the
virtual market, their choice uniquely determines a point on that line. The normalized vector from the current state of
the virtual market to this point forms one of the votes used in De Trenqualye's model. His assumption of nonstrategic local voting is particularly justified in the virtual market transposition because of the extreme difficulty in
collecting useful information about the global preference landscape, and because preferences are likely to be
dynamic anyway.
200
See Kaplow, supra note 80 for a discussion of this decomposition.
201
See supra note 152.
202
See supra nn 73–83 and accompanying text.
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there will be transfers of wealth from low-valuers to high-valuers;203 this will cause labor supply
changes amongst some of these taxpayers. Note also that where such effects are present, they
may be particularly strong, because many information goods are likely to be complements to
leisure.204
Levy-based taxation systems can be expected to produce quite different redistributive
results. One notable effect of flat levies on various kinds of hardware, or on Internet access, is to
make these purchases less attractive for users who do not benefit from information goods
covered by the virtual market. For example, computer users may be discouraged from buying
writeable CDs to take backups if there is a significant levy charged to support artists. A tax on
internet connections may discourage marginal “email only” users if they have to pay a surcharge
to support websites or film swapping. The extent to which this is a problem for society turns on
empirical facts about how many people fall into these categories, and how wealthy they are.
Schemes which combine basic indicators of technology use with a progressive revenue
source may turn out to be the best option. Progressive internet connection levies based on income
or property valuation are examples. If properly designed, these are likely to get much closer to
being “benefit offsetting” than simpler formulae. Whilst there will inevitably be “corner case”
redistributions, these may prove to be quite marginal.
I would conclude that, if it is believed that an existing taxation system represents an
optimal balance, then the distortionary effects of higher taxes are an unambiguous factor in favor
of using technology to enforce exclusive rights. But claiming that the political processes which
govern welfare and taxation systems actually produce optimal social welfare outcomes is,
realistically, rather unrealistic.205 In practice, tying the solution to one economic problem (how to
finance the work of authors and artists) to another — decreasing wealth inequality — may have
unique advantages. The utilitarian implications of using taxation to power the information
economy are uncertain, but it is entirely possible that they are beneficial. In the absence of
detailed data on the distribution of wealth and preferences in a society contemplating an
alternative compensation system, it is safest to assume that the distortionary costs of taxation
203

The social welfare implications of such a redistribution are particularly difficult to estimate. On one hand, they
appear to exacerbate a pre-existing “digital” or “cultural” divide. On the other hand, there may be significant
endogenous demand factors at work in such divisions, and granting universal free access to digital works may, on
balance, serve to reduce them.
204
That is, for many people, paying higher income tax to have free access to music, writing, film, etc, makes working
less a doubly attractive proposition.
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See, e.g., David Brooks, The Triumph of Hope Over Self-Interest, N.Y. TIMES Jan. 12, 2003 (reporting a survey
finding that 39% of U.S. citizens believe they either are, or will at some point during their lives be, within the
wealthiest 1% of the population).
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weigh in favor of the DRM alternative, but we should also be mindful of the positive side effects
which can accompany them.

5. Information Revelation
In order for any resource allocation mechanism (including a market) to function
efficiently, it needs to ensure that information about the value of particular goods (measured by
users' preferences) is employed to determine which goods are produced — or at least, which acts
of production are rewarded. It would be naive to regard the satisfaction of consumer demand as
an ideal guide for cultural creativity,206 but, all other things being equal, information economies
should be lead towards the public's tastes and not away from them.
In a DRM system, valuation information is revealed through the act of payment, by users,
for access to various works; in a virtual market, information is signaled through the process of
voting (or allowing downloads or usage to be sampled). In each case, imperfections in the
information transmission mechanism can result in economic inefficiency. The effect is not direct,
because information is blurred and delayed by the filter of ex anteproduction decisions. But over
time, if particular kinds of works are rewarded more or less richly, then the choices made by
authors, artists, and publishers will gradually be distorted. There are many subtle differences
between the informational imperfections that are inherent in VMRS and DRM. It is the intention
of this section to examine these, with a view to determining whether they might provide grounds
for preferring one system over the other.
a. Transparency
A profound problem with information revelation under DRM relates to the inherently
non-transparent nature of many information goods: Alice can't really tell what they are, until she
has “consumed” them.207 So, if consumers have to pay for a piece of writing before they read it,
for example, then they will be signaling their anticipated valuation, rather than an actual
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See supra nn 144–145 and accompanying text. In this sense, the existence of a virtual market would not affect
arguments for organizations such as the National Endowment for the Arts, which have aesthetic goals other than
popularity and may play an important role in the development of artistic tastes.
207
See J. Bradford DeLong and A. Michael Froomkin, Speculative Microeconomics for Tomorrow's Economy FIRST
MONDAY Feb. 2000, at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue5_2/delong/ (emphasizing the importance of
transparency in modern information economies); Arrow, supra note 40, at 615 (highlighting similar problems in
markets for industrial information); Lisa N. Takeyama, Piracy, Asymmetrical Information, and Product Quality
Revelation,
Society
for
Economic
Research
on
Copyright
Issues,
June
2002,
http://www.serci.org/2002/takeyama.pdf (arguing that these effects should be counted against strict copyright
systems in economic analyses). A similar concept is captured by Nelson's distinction between “experience” and
“search” goods; see Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behaviour, 78 J. POL. ECO. 311 (1970).
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valuation.
To some extent, lack-of-transparency problems are attenuated by providing sample
chapters of books, trailers for films, or by allowing music purchasers to listen to 30 second clips
before they buy songs. Depending on the particular medium, there are various transaction costs
and limitations associated with these strategies. Lack of transparency creates a degree of
inefficiency in copyright systems of all sorts, and DRM only partially alleviates the problem. In
contrast, because VMRS allows users to decide if they like things after they have experienced
them, it is capable of providing incentives which are more closely attuned to consumer's
preferences.
b. Reliance on non-payment signals
When Alice has to pay money in order to obtain a work, her dollars act as a limited sort
of “guarantee of sincerity”. In this respect, we can be relatively certain that a DRM-based
marketplace is, up to a point, reporting the public's preferences accurately.208 A virtual market
based on usage metering and votes, in contrast, does not require Alice to “put her money where
her mouth is”, as it were. One must wonder what implications this could have for the preferences
so revealed.
One concern is that the samples collected by a voting system might somehow be skewed,
particularly if certain sub-demographics of Internet users were statistically more likely to vote
than others. Provided, however, that download or usage statistics are available as a fallback, this
effect is unlikely to be problematic. Alternative compensation systems can cast wide enough
nets for their data, that even the rarest of netizens will be represented in the results.209
A second possible cause of inaccurate preference revelation in a virtual market —
conscious misrepresentation of preferences in votes — is more complicated. As I argued in
Section II.B.6, in the absence of clear incentives to do otherwise, a combination of self-interest210
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This is not a rigorous guarantee; if piracy was more prevalent amongst certain demographics — teenagers being
an extreme example — their preferences might receive a discounted response from the market. There are certainly
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at
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people paying for things which they do not really want.
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disclose their preferences honestly).

60

and cultural factors should make accurate voting a default behavior.211 So while there is no
financial guarantee that Alice must vote accurately, it seems that the system can be designed to
avoid incentives to vote inaccurately. Even if there was a degree of misinformation, the residual
imperfections in the results would not necessarily decrease the efficiency of the system.212
One should also acknowledge a subtle interaction between the artist and the audience
which affects preference disclosure. In much the same way that successful street performers
cajole their audience into making payments, or some recording musicians discourage their
audiences from free-riding with pirated music downloads, many artists working in a virtual
market would no doubt encourage their audiences to vote “early and often”. It could be argued
that this creates an incentive distortion which disadvantages artists who are either unable or
unwilling to guide their audiences in this manner. While this argument is certainly valid, it
appears that it applies almost as extensively to copyright-based markets as it does to their virtual
alternatives.
So while it does not appear that there are grounds for regarding the role of non-payment
signals as particularly problematic in an alternative compensation system, it remains the case that
DRM systems — absent piracy, at any rate — perform this particular task optimally. This
constitutes a reason, albeit a rather marginal one, for preferring the latter system.
c. One-user-one-vote effects
A DRM based marketplace is a “one dollar, one vote” system. As discussed above,213 it
might be possible to weight votes in a virtual market in order to create something similar.
Similar, though not entirely the same — because the amount of tax one pays in a virtual market
is not a direct function of the number of works one consumes. To first order, this is unlikely
affect the information extracted from the system; while some (in statistical terms) very
enthusiastic purchasers of copyright works will have their tastes attenuated by this effect, if there
are others whose similar tastes are being amplified, the results will be equivalent.214 It is only if
there is a very strong correlation between certain tastes and a willingness to pay significantly
more than the tax rate, that inefficiencies become an issue.
Under certain circumstances, where the range of consumer preferences is highly skewed,
211
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the lack of a true “democracy of dollars” might undermine the ability of users to support the
production of high-value, small-market works. The DRM model could avoid these limitations,
and in general, this might be a serious drawback which should be counted against alternative
compensation systems. I will argue, however that there is an important ameliorating factor,
which, although it does not eliminate “one user, one vote” problems, serves to significantly
reduce them. It results from the application of virtual markets solely to digital information goods
and solely to consumer, as opposed to commercial, uses of information.215
First, let us consider the case in which a high value, niche work might be produced and
funded by large payments from a few wealthy contributors. Certainly, we can find examples of
these works — valuable paintings, sculptures and prints; operatic and theatrical performances;
detailed market research and business intelligence documents. Amongst artistic works, it would
appear that a high-value nature is consistently associated with a high-quality “authentic” item or
experience, with poor substitutability for mass-market copies. By definition, it is almost
impossible for digital art to possess these properties. Lower value reproductions (recordings of
operas, posters of artistic masterpieces) exhibit something which I would term the “phenomenon
of near constant prices”.216 These goods could fit elegantly within a virtual market without
causing problematic incentive distortions. Alternative compensation systems seem to handle
these unusual cases reasonably well, even without recourse to the still-available addition of
commission and patronage as sources of support for high-value, small-market digital artistry.217
d. Network effects and contests over the definition of “cultural space”
Mark Nadel has argued that the role of advertising for copyright works, in defining and
manipulating something that I would term “cultural space” — the lingua franca of those
interactions between individuals and amongst social groups which are mediated by culture —
may result in a wasteful dissipation of resources.218 This might be a significant cause of market
failure, in which case it would be relevant to know whether alternative compensation systems
could avoid such problems.
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It seems that many cultural goods create a subtle system of network externalities amongst
their audience. Ordinary human interactions are regularly filled with references to both popular
and niche culture, and our perspectives on the word are unavoidably colored by the art and
entertainment we consume. Many adults read Harry Potter novels, rather than other works of
fantasy, so that they can follow dinner party conversations, and not because they expect to enjoy
those particular books more. Naturally, building and exploiting networks around their products
is an important strategy for copyright owners. So, as Nadel points out, the existence of cultural
externalities results in marketing contests over the definition of cultural space; there are many
tunes which are capable of capturing the human psyche, but only a few of them will top the
charts.219
These expensive advertising contests are in some respects similar to the “race to invent”
or “common pool problem” discussed in the literature on patent systems.220 There is no general
solution to this problem unless the institutions which provide financial incentives can somehow
obtain and respond to comparative information about all of the players competing for each niche
in cultural space.221
On one level, exclusionary copyright and publicly funded rewards appear to suffer
equally from races to define cultural space. Because virtual markets mimic real market returns,
there will be an excess of investment in marketing a few costly cultural products, while society
would be better off with more diverse investment in cultural creation — a level playing field of
more works, the best of which evolve to define “cultural space”. “Optimal” cultural production
can occur only when the returns on information goods are not just an increasing function of
demand or value for the good, but also a decreasing function of the resources dissipated in
embedding them in networks of cultural externalities. It is not at first obvious how institutions
for financing creativity could achieve this.
But while a formulaic solution to the problem is impractical, it could conceivably be
mitigated by social processes made possible by a virtual market.

If users reward works

according to both their subjective quality, and the fact that they are not supported by strong
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marketing, then resource dissipation through races will decrease. This is a behavior that some
people would be inclined to engage in naturally (“I’ll vote for independent bands as a matter of
principle”), but it could also be explicitly encouraged. The extent to which it might succeed in
short-circuiting marketing contests depends, of course, on the way that individuals make these
tradeoffs, and lies well beyond the scope of the present inquiry. But it is apparent that the option
given to people by virtual markets, to allocate remuneration that is not in strict proportion to
consumption, is advantageous.
e. Information about the size of the market
The preceding discussions have addressed the role of information about the relative value
of different works. Another kind of information, which is also of great importance, relates to the
total demand for digital culture — or equivalently, about the appropriate size of the market.
In an ordinary copyright marketplace, the volume of production is adjusted continuously
as consumers spend more, or less, on cultural works. Virtual markets should in some way
attempt to emulate this process, and I discussed above some of the methods by which this could
be achieved, settling on contingent valuation surveys as the most practical and effective method
measuring total demand.222 But even if these surveys were producing excellent data, it is hard to
see how they could be as reliable as a market-based solution.
This is not to say that exclusive rights guarantee an optimal level of cultural production.
There are many aspects of copyright law which are the subject of political decision making —
including as the duration of rights, thresholds of originality, or the scope of fair use and other
exceptions. Most of these decisions ultimately affect the size of the market. One need look no
further than the retrospective Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 to see that
governments can get these decisions completely wrong. And it has been demonstrated that, at
least under certain circumstances, excessive rights can lead to overproduction.223
Because of the possibility of imperfections in the size of an alternative compensation
system, market size information probably gives us grounds for preferring the use of exclusive
copyright. While it is not clear that the total volume of compensation would always (or even
usually) be inappropriate, that possibility is clearly present. And although governments clearly
make grave errors in setting copyright policies, most (but not all) of the ensuing negative
consequences are unrelated to information revelation. It is safest to conclude that market size
222
223
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information should be counted in favor of DRM.
f. Information revelation as a whole
Having examined the comparative informational properties of virtual markets and DRMbased copyright, it is apparent that there are a number of fairly subtle effects superimposed on
each other when these systems determine how much cultural producers should be paid. Neither
institution can claim to be optimal; lack of transparency and contests over cultural space are
clearly inefficient aspects of copyright markets, while the need to determine the size of a virtual
market is potentially problematic, and the use of votes rather than dollars has some more
peripheral drawbacks.
Under VMRS, market size effects might make entertainment industries less responsive to
fluctuations in aggregate demand. But at the same time, the damping of contests over cultural
space, and avoidance of the need to “buy before you try”, might go some way to reducing some
excessive and objectively undesirable commercialistic aspects of modern cultural goods.
These informational phenomena would make the two systems genuinely different in
economic terms, but it also seems that too many psychological factors are at work for economic
models to be of much normative guidance on the matter. I would be reluctant to conclude that
this aspect of the comparison could be anything other than ambiguous.

D. Economic Conclusions
Section III.C enumerated and examined diverse sets of points of economic comparison
between virtual markets and technologically-enforced exclusive rights (this analysis is
summarized in Table 1). One of those sets, relating to comparative informational imperfections,
does not clearly favor either kind of remuneration system. There were two factors where one
model had a small efficiency lead (the distortionary costs of taxation, for DRM, and transaction
costs, for VMRS). Finally, there were two areas where virtual markets were clearly greatly
superior — deadweight loss, and infrastructure costs.
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Table 1: Summary of economic comparison between DRM and virtual markets
FACTOR
(AND SUB-FACTORS)

IMMEDIATE
EFFECT
FAVORS

AMELIORATING POINTS

CONCLUSION

Artificial scarcity
(§ III.C.1)

VMRS

Price discrimination

DRM

Negative distributional
side-effects possible

Interactions with social
inequality

VMRS

Only if welfare systems
prevent poverty

Computer security &
infrastructure costs
(§III.C.2)

VMRS

Rights clearance
transaction costs
(§III.C.3)

VMRS

Fair use & collective
licensing

Clear advantage for
VMRS

DRM

Use of taxes on
complimentary goods

Likely to favor DRM

Distortionary taxation
(§III.C.4)
Redistribution effects
may decrease inequality
Information revelation
(§III.C.5)

Very substantial
advantage for VMRS

VMRS
Ambiguous

Non-payment signaling

DRM

Lack of transparency

VMRS

One user, one vote
effects

DRM

Contests over cultural
space

VMRS

Information about the
size of the market

DRM

Very substantial
advantage for VMRS
Mitigates artificial
scarcity to some degree
Amplifies cost of
scarcity; limits price
discrimination

Clear benefit of VMRS
Numerous

Samples are effective
for some goods
Phenomenon of nearconstant prices
Requires a culture of
voting for unusual
works
Copyright policy affects
market sizes too

Ambiguous
Slight advantage for
DRM
Advantage for VMRS for
some media
Slight advantage for
DRM
Difficult to quantify
advantage for VMRS
Likely advantage for
DRM

After canceling terms, there are two major economic factors which favor VMRS, without
comparable countervailing effects. Though tentative, the magnitude of the result indicates that
society could, on the balance of probabilities, expect better outcomes under a well-implemented
alternative compensation system than under a well-implemented system of technologically
enforced exclusive rights.
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While various results in the economics literature apply to parts of this analysis, many
aspects of this economic comparison deserve further research projects of their own. And even
then, an overall conclusion could only aspire to reliability in the presence of solid experimental
experience — experience that is unavailable, because at this juncture virtual markets are
hypothetical institutions, and DRM remains an immature and heavily contested branch of
technology.
It would be undeniably quixotic to expect a nation so large, and so healthily skeptical of
government as the United States, to plunge headlong into an attempt to create virtual markets on
the basis of nothing more than academic research. A more practical and prudent conclusion is
that experimentation with alternative compensation systems is desirable. Such experiments
should perhaps be encouraged in smaller, more “out of the way” markets where less is at stake,
where the political obstacles might be less daunting, and where experience could be collected
about the pitfalls associated with these systems. If the evidence then suggested that virtual
markets could work efficiently in practice, larger nations might be in a position to seriously
evaluate them as policy alternatives.
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IV.

IMPLEMENTING VIRTUAL MARKET REWARD SYSTEMS
Implementing a virtual market system for digital music and writing, even on a temporary,

“experimental” basis, is a non-trivial prospect. As with any other proposal for large-scale
infrastructure, consideration must be given to legality and technical feasibility, and to any
unintended side effects that VMRS might entail. Even if virtual markets remain a purely
hypothetical notion, the complexities and implications which would accompany an attempt to
make them real, should be included in any evaluation. This section comprises a set of brief
observations on these issues.

A. Legal Requirements
1. Blanket licenses

The minimalist approach to constructing a legalized virtual market would not involve an
overhaul of the copyright system. Instead, a government could issue blanket licenses to cover the
specific activities required by VMRS.
In particular, this would be a license for the exclusive rights of reproduction and
communication to the public,224 and relevant neighboring rights, covering only copies made by
individual citizens, for non-commercial purposes, within the operation of a VMRS, and where
remuneration is being provided by the virtual market. Other exclusive rights, such as the rights of
publication or derivation, and rights for commercial uses of works, would be unaffected.225
It is important to note that numerous acts of reproduction — such as making works
available for download by the citizens of nations not participating in the virtual market, or
making unauthorized copies for commercial purposes — would still constitute copyright
224

As required by Article 8 of the 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty.
The exclusive right of derivation raises another set of complicated normative challenges for digital copyright law.
It is natural for authors examining alternative compensation systems to suggest that they should also replace
derivation rights. So, for example, Fisher proposes that artists who include elements of others' works within their
own, should be required to declare that fact, thereby passing a (relatively small) fraction of the revenue from the
modified work, back to the creator of the original; see Fisher, supra note 49, at 10,39–42. Netanel, in contrast,
suggests that exemptions from the exclusive right of derivation should only be available for non-commercial
purposes, and that all of the remuneration for those modified works should flow to the original artist; see Netanel,
supra note 49, § V.A.1.c. While these proposals have some attractive features, it seems that the question of
derivative works remains to some degree independent to the central problem of reproduction.
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infringement.
Finally, in the long term, it might not even be necessary to make the VMRS license
compulsory — provided the terms that authors and artists receive from it were fair, most rights
holders would choose to participate voluntarily. But, in the context of a nation experimenting
with the creation of a virtual market, a universal license would be indispensable in ensuring that
rights clearance did not become an insurmountable obstacle to launching the system. Once the
project had been running for a reasonable period, it would become possible to evaluate the need
(or otherwise) for universal coverage.

2. International Treaty Obligations
In the area of intellectual property, perhaps more than in any other so consequential area
of policy, national rules are constrained by the mechanisms of international law. In particular, the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property rights (TRIPs)
(which incorporates most of the Berne convention), and the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty
(WCT) and Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), constrain national sovereignty with
respect to copyright. Each of these four treaties includes a codification of the so-called “Berne
three-step test”, which sets out criteria that national exceptions to copyright would have to
satisfy;226 although there are other avenues for exceptions to some particular rights, none are
sufficiently broad to address file sharing, for example. The three-step test was devised during the
1960s as a measure to ensure that nations could not use exceptions to dilute the exclusive rights
with which copyright was constructed. Unsurprisingly, it could not anticipate the more vexed
problems of digital copyright, and it is entirely possible that it precludes experimentation with
policy proposals such as virtual markets, which are designed to address them.
Article 13 of TRIPs, on Limitations and Exceptions to copyright, is the most important
instantiation of the three-step test,227 not least because conformance with TRIPs is a World Trade
Organization membership condition, and WTO dispute resolution mechanisms can be used to
enforce it against recalcitrant nations. Article 13 reads:
226

For further discussion of the spread of the three-step test, see Thomas Heide, The Berne Three-Step Test and the
Proposed Copyright Directive, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 105 (1999).
227
Note that the terminology of WCT Article 10, and Article 9 (2) of the Berne Convention is slightly less restrictive,
referring to the “author” rather than the “right holder”. WPPT Article 16 refers to the “performer or producer of the
phonogram”. The Berne article covers only the exclusive right of reproduction, and is thus significantly weaker. The
result of ratifying all of these variants of the test, however, is a conjunctive requirement which is slightly more
constraining than TRIPs alone.
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Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights
to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the right holder.
The juridical interpretation of this terminology is made difficult by its broad scope and
the generality of the language. A number of legal commentators have explored the test in great
depth,228 and there has been one WTO panel ruling dealing with the legality of United States
secondary broadcast performance exemptions under Article 13.229 There has also been one WTO
panel ruling on TRIPs Article 30, which is a derivative application of the three-step test to
patents.
It would not be productive to reproduce here the voluminous reasoning available in these
sources. Instead, I will attempt to highlight the aspects of the test which interact with proposals
for alternative compensation systems, and to identify the points of jurisprudence which are most
important in allowing or disallowing VMRS under Article 13.
1. Blanket licenses can only be granted in certain special cases. It would be straightforward to
argue that a VMRS exception would not be a “special case”, because it is not a “narrow”
license for the right of reproduction.230 It would cover many works for many users. Although
this is true, it ignores a crucial aspect of the issue. Of all the myriad ways and contexts in
228

See SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 18861986 482–9 (1987); Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the
“Three-Step Test” for Copyright Exceptions, 187 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 3 (2001),
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=253867; Mihály Ficsor, How much of what? The “three-step test” and
its application in two recent WTO dispute settlement cases, 192 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 110
(2002).
229
See WTO Dispute Settlement Panel, Report on Section 110(5) of the United States Copyright Act, (2000),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/1234da.pdf [hereinafter Panel]. The two exemptions in question
allowed shops, bars and restaurants to play radio or television broadcasts on their premises without licenses from
collecting societies. One exemption covered the use of a single “home style” stereo or television (and was allowed
by the WTO). The other exempted premises smaller than a certain size, or using fewer than a certain number of
speakers or televisions (and was held to violate Article 13). For an extensive commentary on the licensing regimes
and politics which lead to the dispute, see Laurence R. Helfer, World Music on a U.S. Stage: a Berne/TRIPs and
Economic Analysis of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 80 B. U. L. REV. 93 (2000).
230
The W.T.O. dispute settlement panel has stated that the word “special” should be interpreted as meaning
“narrow”; see Panel, id., ¶6.109. Dictionaries are more likely to suggest partial synonyms such as “peculiar”,
“exceptional”, “distinctive” or “limited” (drawn from the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary and the GNU
Collaborative International Dictionary of English). The panel report itself cites the Oxford English Dictionary as
providing “having a limited application or purpose”, “containing details; precise; specific”, “exceptional in quality
or degree; unusual; out of the ordinary” or “distinctive in some way”. It seems to this author, at least, that the word
“narrow” adds further, significant constraint beyond all of these meanings; it would perhaps be equivalent to
“having limited application or purpose”, but not “having a limited application or purpose”.
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which rights of reproduction could be infringed, downloads which are part of a specifically
organized public reward mechanism are peculiar, limited, and are, literally, a special case.
2. Blanket licenses may not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work. This requirement
poses the greatest hurdle for VMRS legality. Attempts to interpret it are fraught with
circularity, since legal exceptions, cultural practices, and changing technology all conflate in
defining “normality” (and each other).
There are two fundamental senses in which “normal exploitation” can be read — a positive
(descriptive) measure of how works are used, and a normative (prescriptive) statement of how
they should be usable.231 The WTO panel has stated that it should measure both.232
The panel went on to state that exceptions would conflict with the normal exploitation of a
right “if uses, that in principle are covered by that right but exempted under the exception or
limitation, enter into economic competition with the ways that right holders normally extract
economic value from that right to the work... and thereby deprive them of significant or
tangible commercial gains.”.233
It is thus likely that, if the blanket license which enabled VMRS curtailed forms of
exploitation of considerable economic importance, then it would be found to violate Article
13 of TRIPs. On the other hand, if the reality of peer-to-peer file sharing, the ineffectiveness
of technical protection measures, and the comparatively small size of licensed download
markets, deny some copyright holders a “normal exploitation” of their work on the Internet,
then in those cases, a blanket license might constitute, rather than conflicting with, the normal
use of the work.234
3. Blanket licenses must not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.
The dispute settlement panel has indicated that a significant part of this step involves
231

The strength of the normative component may not be apparent from a direct reading of the test itself. It can,
however, be found in the 1964 report of a Study Group set up by the Swedish Government and the Bureaux
Internationeaux Reunis pour la Protection de la Propriete Intellectuelle (BIRPI, the predecessor of WIPO), the
original proposal which evolved into the three-step test. The Study Group stated that “all forms of exploiting a
work, which have, or are likely to acquire, considerable economic or practical importance, must be reserved to the
authors” (Study Group report, page 42, cited Panel, supra note 229, at ¶¶ 6.179–180). Although the form of Berne
Article 9(2) changed through political debate at the Stockholm conference (see Ficsor, supra note 228, §§ II.1–3),
casting ambiguity on its enactors' intentions, returning to the original Study Group documents for interpretation of
the test is would seem to be allowed by Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
232
See Panel, supra note 229, ¶6.166.
233
See Panel, supra note 229, ¶6.183.
234
Ginsburg implies something similar when considering digital private copying exemptions: “an exception for
large-scale `private' copying of the `sharing' type might well conflict with a normal exploitation (assuming the
copyright could be enforced in this kind of situation)” Ginsburg, supra note 229, at 16 (emphasis added).
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evaluating the economic harm suffered by copyright owners.235
Although the panel left the open the possibility of considering normative factors other than
economic value when identifying “unreasonable prejudice” to rights holders' “legitimate
interests”, it is worth noting that such factors are to a large extent the subject of the “normal
exploitation” step of the test.236
It therefore seems that if the blanket licenses in question are able to pass the second step of
the test, being demonstrably the most practical (normal) means of rewarding authors for
digital distribution of their works, then, properly funded and fairly administered, they would
be unable to unreasonably prejudice those authors' legitimate interests.
With its extremely high minimum levels for exclusive rights, TRIPs poses a formidable
barrier to constructive reform of (or even experimentation with) the structure of national
copyright systems. Adjustments to TRIPs require an international consensus and would not occur
if any major rights holder, anywhere, objected strenuously.237 Should a nation decide to try
deploying a virtual market reward system, it would be useful to consider what changes in
jurisprudence would be required for a dispute resolution panel to allow VMRS under Article 13.
Following the reasoning above, it would be necessary to resolve two key jurisprudential issues,
and satisfy one key empirical condition about the circumstances under which the virtual market
appeared.
The empirical condition depends on the fact that DRM — technologically mediated
copyright — must be failing to deliver satisfactory mass-markets for information goods. Peer-topeer file sharing would have to be prevailing in its competition with licensed music download
services. This condition is also an important political prerequisite for VMRS, and it is therefore
unlikely that the matter would reach a WTO dispute settlement panel if digital copyright was
proving workable. Any government defending a virtual market license would likely be appearing
before the a dispute settlement panel equipped with significant evidence of the practical
shortcomings of DRM.
One legal question relates to the determination of the panel to read the first part of Article
235

See Panel, supra note 229, ¶¶ 6.227, 6.229.
Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 228, at 16 (arguing that private copying exceptions are in danger from the second step).
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The debate over TRIPs and access to essential medicines in developing countries is illustrative here. Despite
being an issue of exceptional political potency, developing countries and NGOs could achieve only an interpretive
concession at the Doha WTO meeting in November 2001. Even after that point, it took some time for the U.S.
administration to accept compulsory licensing and parallel importation as a legitimate solution to health crises in
Africa; see the Consumer Project on Technology's resources on parallel importation and access to essential
medicines, http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/.
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13 as a very stringent constraint on the ability of sovereign states to adjust their approach to
copyright in response to public policy dilemmas. If the WTO reads the term “special” as
“narrow”-ly as possible, then VMRS (and indeed almost any digital private copying measure) is
clearly precluded. If, on the other hand, “certain special cases” is read in English, then these
kinds of blanket licenses should be admissible.
The second legal issue hinges on whether the failure of DRM to prevent widespread
unauthorized sharing of information goods, would allow virtual markets to avoid conflicting with
the “normal exploitation” of works. One point which might complicate this question of
“normalcy” is the role of states in policing copyright and adopting “TRIPs plus” policies. It is
quite possible that in states where TRIPs and WCT standards are implemented predominantly by
providing civil remedies, that “user pays” enforcement will prove insufficient to make DRM
work. Digital exclusive rights might require large taxpayer expenditure on the policing of
copyright; indirect public expense, by requiring ISPs to take a proactive role in copyright
enforcement; or the enactment of specific laws that curtail file sharing.238 If these phenomena
were to occur in some states, and not in others, differing pictures of the “normal” use of
copyrighted works might arise.
The Berne three-step test was devised as a mechanism to reinforce a model of copyright
based in exclusive rights. The remarkable realpolitik of intellectual property has seen it
globalized and reinforced as a component of an all but ubiquitous set of trade institutions. The
virtual market model is inherently based on the theory that exclusive rights are not the most
efficient or practical mechanism for regulating consumer use and access to digital culture. It is
improbable that an alternative compensation camel could be squeezed through the Article 13 eye
of the TRIPs needle. Nonetheless, because the test is based on descriptive principles and
constructed with English words, it might just prove itself flexible to allow some limited
experimentation with virtual markets. If such experiments proved successful, then TRIPs would,
no doubt, become a less substantial obstacle to alternative compensation systems.

B. National versus International Virtual Markets
Whilst it is simplest (and undeniably tempting) to analyze the economics of incentive
structures as an isolable question of government policy, the reality of copyright is inherently
multilateral. Since a global transition from exclusive copyright to virtual markets is inordinately
238
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improbable, any approach to VMRS would not only have to be localized and experimental, but
would also have to mesh — at least to some degree — with the existing system of international
trade in information goods.
The need to have alternative compensation mechanisms running side-by- side with
traditional copyright systems, separated only by permeable national borders, gives rise to some
concerns. Would not the plethora of file sharing and digitization encouraged by the virtual
market of the hypothetical Republic of Freedonia239 destabilize the vigorously enforced, licensed
and digitally rights-managed endeavors of neighboring Copyrightland? Would many of those
unencrypted files find their way onto Copyrightland's computers?
The answer, to some extent, is yes. Such transfers would not be legal on either side of the
border,240 but it must be admitted that they would occur. If the DRM systems deployed in
Copyrightland were watertight, it could also be said that cross-border piracy of this sort would
pose a distinctive threat to the sustainability of Copyrightland's policies; but, as I have argued,
watertight DRM is likely to be prohibitively expensive.241 As it stands, any copyright system
which hopes to be sustainable will have to be sustainable in competition with file sharing which
is suppressed more by the use of enforcement to successfully “compete with free”, than by a
constricted supply of raw material. And, under these circumstances, the same enforcement
mechanisms are available to rights holders in both Freedonia and Copyrightland. It transpires, I
believe, that Freedonia need not pose a greater threat to copyright elsewhere, than digital
technology does in the first place.
Another question raised by the operation of reward systems in a global context, is
whether most of the taxation revenue distributed by the virtual market of Freedonia, would be
sent directly to foreign publishing companies, authors and artists. Taxpayers might inevitably be
disinclined to support that state of affairs, thereby undermining the stability and feasibility of
VMRS. A similar dilemma confronts countries operating private copying and public lending
rights schemes today, though on a smaller scale.242
One predictable political response to this situation would be to constrain the fraction of
virtual market funding which could flow overseas. Such proposals might be based on reciprocity
239

With apologies to both the Marx Brothers and RMS.
See supra § IV.A.1.
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See supra § III.C.2.
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See, e.g., MICHAEL RUSHTON, Economic Impact of WIPO Ratification on Private Copying Regime, (a report
prepared for Candian Heritage Department's Copyright Policy Branch), (2002), http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/acca/progs/pda-cpb/pubs/ompi-wapo/wapo.pdf.
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in flows of rewards (if other countries have also implemented VMRS), or in flows of ordinary
copyright royalties. Arguments would no doubt be made that the total amount flowing from
Freedonia to Copyrightland, should be limited to the total flow of comparable copyright royalties
from the Copyrightland to Freedonia.
A system of reciprocity in funding for cultural production might find some supporters in
certain quarters of states (other than the United States) that are particularly critical of processes
of “cultural globalization”. This approach is, however, all but precluded by the national treatment
principle embodied in international treaties on intellectual property.243 According to that norm,
virtual market funding which replaced the royalties of the copyright marketplace would have to
be distributed without consideration of national boundaries.
The best solution to the political problems of imbalanced cultural trade would be to
emphasize that the responsibility for these transfers lies with taxpayers themselves. This would
be precisely the case if each VMRS participant had control of exactly their own tax
contribution,244 but should also be possible even if there is some redistribution of votes in the
process. The logic of a virtual market with national treatment is the same as the logic of a free
market in general — Freedonia's dollars are moving offshore precisely when Freedonia's
taxpayers are sending them there. It is then up to each individual to weight the value of different
goods, including their contribution to cultural diversity and the parochial interest of supporting
the local economy – in the same way that this occurs in ordinary, private goods markets, or the
existing copyright system.

C. Privacy Implications
Would an alternative compensation system result in massive violations of the public's
privacy?245 In the long run, a virtual market would contain a database of the cultural and
informational preferences of an entire society. It goes without saying that there are uses to which
such data should not be put. Private information about intellectual consumption should be
shielded, not only by administrative regulations preventing the use of information pertaining to
243

Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention on Literary and Artistic Works, and article 3 of TRIPs, implement national
treatment, which requires that any rights granted domestically by a member state to its own authors, must also be
granted for works originating in other signatory states.
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See supra § II.B.4.
245
It is, of course, not only alternative compensation systems which have troubling privacy implications. The
difficulty of protecting personal information under DRM is, if anything, even greater; see, e.g. Julie E. Cohen, DRM
and Privacy, xxx BERKELEY TECH. L.J. xxx (2003).

75

individuals, but by cryptographic mechanisms which ensure that such information could not be
extracted at all.
The voting or download mechanisms in a virtual market would be most wisely
implemented using a system of pseudonymous identities,246 so that at a first inspection, it would
be possible to tell that some participating citizen had registered a particular set of votes, but it
would not be possible to identify them directly. The important variable in this arrangement is the
strength of pseudonymity. Depending on the method by which keys are allocated to the public, it
would be possible to achieve strong or weak identity protection.
In a strong scheme, the identities would be created using “blind signatures”.247 In that
case, the government would be able to tell that they have authorized a particular pseudonym, but
are unable to then determine which of their authorized users is employing it.
In a weak scheme, identities would be certified by a so-called “fair blind signature”,248
which allows a “trusted third party” (TTP), such as a judge, to remove pseudonymity in cases
where there is evidence of fraud. The TTP's records would have the potential to reveal the
reading and listening habits of every member of society, and allowing indiscriminate use would
be inappropriate. It would be necessary for pseudonymity-compromising information to be
stored offline. It would also be wise to split the TTP role between several different
organizations,249 all of which would have to cooperate in order to reveal a VMRS participant's
identity.
Even if the very strong steps I have suggested were not taken, virtual markets would do
little to decrease online privacy. Law enforcement agencies already have access to much more
revealing information through sources such as “Carnivore” devices at ISPs,250 or through the
monitoring of email traffic at the Internet backbone. Carnivore, for example, gives the U.S.
government knowledge about when individual Americans browse the web, what they have read
and what they have searched for.

Resourceful crackers are perfectly capable of turning

computers that they control into their own privatized equivalents of Carnivore.
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On pseudonymity, see supra note 69.
See David Chaum, Blind Signature System, in D. Chaum, ed., PROC. CRYPTO 83, 153 (1984).
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See Markus Stadler et al., Fair Blind Signatures, in PROC. EUROCRYPT '95, 209 (1995),
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ink” signatures; see Markus Jakobsson and Moti Yung, Distributed Magic Ink DSS Signatures, in PROC.
EUROCRYPT '97, 450 (1997), http://rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/staff/bios/mjakobsson/hint/hint.pdf. In that case, the
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It is true that knowledgeable Internet users can find ways around online surveillance —
software such as GnuPG251 or PGP252, and services such as Hushmail253, can provide secure
email systems; anonymizing proxies allow (limited) browsing privacy.254 But maintaining one's
digital privacy is a difficult activity which few people are motivated to pursue; it is only those
who already do so who stand to be substantially affected by either DRM on VMRS — and it is
precisely these individuals who possess the technical wherewithal to continue obtaining
information goods through unlicensed (underground or offline) channels.

D. Impacts upon Existing Structures of Cultural Production & Distribution
Some readers may suspect that virtual market models, if influential, would cause the role
of the publisher to gradually shrink and disappear. One could also argue that explicit
encouragement of the use of digital works at zero marginal cost would result in the rapid
“cannibalization” of markets for physical information goods (such as books, CDs, or DVDs) by
an alternative compensation system. These paired effects would be traumatic for the numerous
people currently employed in the many corners of the entertainment industry. The prospect of
cannibalization also undermines the possibility of incremental introduction of alternative
compensation systems which only replace those revenues lost to rights holders from file
sharing.255
Fortunately the extent of these effects is not quite as disruptive as might at first be
imagined, especially when we discount the changes in information production which are in any
case accompanying the transition from a marketplace based on physically embodied information
goods, to one based on files on hard disks.

Consider the role of publishing companies.

Publishers often make indispensable contributions which assist authors, for example, in
producing written works. They organize the editing, layout, and marketing of books — digital or
otherwise — and they may regularly shoulder some of the risk in a publishing venture by paying
the author in advance. All of these roles close or identical equivalents in other cultural industries
— and all of them continue to be relevant and necessary in a virtual market.
251

The “GNU Privacy Guard”; see http://www.gnupg.org.
“Pretty Good Privacy”; see http://www.pgp.com/.
253
See http://www.hushmail.com.
254
Traffic analysis and pattern recognition attacks render all but the most extravagant of anonymization efforts
transparent. For a survey of research in this area, see Larry Korba and Ronggong Song, Review of Network-based
Approaches for Privacy, in PROC. 14TH CANADIAN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY SYMPOSIUM (2002),
http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/song02review.html.
255
See Liebowitz, supra note 84, at 6.
252

77

The one significant task which publishing companies lose under VMRS is that of a
clearing-house for digital rights to the works they have published. This may in the longer term
have an impact on some publishing organizations, especially where returns on market power
have resulted in particularly concentrated ownership of copyrights; however, it is difficult to
argue that dissolution of this kind of market power would be a disadvantageous feature of virtual
markets in the medium to long term.
Other organizations that might be disadvantaged by virtual markets are those involved in
the distribution and sale of physical information goods. If virtual markets are funded by general
taxation, then record and book stores, for example, might charge that VMRS represented a crosssubsidy to digital media, one that would place them at a significant disadvantage. Of course, in
the long term, as technologies for purely digital distribution improve, these effects are likely to
occur anyway, but it is correct that if VMRS applies only to works distributed on the Internet,
then it does amount to a cross-subsidy.
The answer to this problem may be to codify ways in which virtual market votes could
also apply to non-digital works.256 For example, a record store might be able to sell royalty-free
CDs of custom-burned songs, provided the purchasers were making corresponding virtual market
votes at the same time. Similarly, book stores could sell titles at royalty-discounted rates, or use
print on demand systems to sell works which they do not have in stock. If these applications of
virtual markets approximately succeed in reducing the cost of books and CDs by the rate of
royalties paid, then any distortionary cross-subsidy effects are removed. Under such a regime,
consumers are free to choose whichever distribution medium they prefer, at prices which reflect
the underlying costs of those media.

E. The Prospect of Censorship
If artists are to depend on VMRS for their incomes, then a government which decides to
engage in censorship will be able to prevent them from earning rewards from the virtual market.
Opponents of censorship might regard this as a disadvantage of VMRS.
It is not genuinely clear, however, that VMRS would be any better for censors than a
system of copyright patrolled by technology. A DRM mechanism would almost certainly require
centralized processes for rights clearance and policing; if a government is intent on denying
censored works access to digital infrastructure, they could do so just as easily under ordinary
256
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copyright law.257
Artists attempting to distribute censored material have found, and will continue to find,
the Internet to be a very useful medium. Whether or not they will be able to claim substantial
payment for their efforts is another issue - but it is not really affected by the “legitimate”
incentive structures created and supported by governments.
Separate from the possibility that an alternative compensation system would facilitate
censorship, is the possibility that it would make censorship more probable in a political sense.
The problem here is the involvement of taxpayers’ money; those who pay tax whilst taking
exception to particular kinds of works would soon be clamoring to have the system sanitized.
One way of circumventing this difficulty lies in guaranteeing that each user's dollars go
exclusively to works that they themselves appreciate.258
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V.CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS
A. Outstanding Objections
The argument presented in this paper — that VMRS systems might well produce better
outcomes for society, in a utilitarian sense, than DRM-enforced copyright — is reasonably
robust. But it is useful to examine some of the more common outstanding objections which
people raise against virtual markets.
The government simply has no role to play in information markets — this is common
ideological objection to VMRS. It is however, somewhat inconsistent as a defense of DRM,
because the government must create and police a costly (and abusable) infrastructure of
exclusive rights, anti-circumvention laws, and possibly standards,259 in order for DRM to work.
Therefore, rather than representing a choice between regulation and free markets, DRM and
VMRS embody two different forms of regulatory infrastructure.260
It is also worth noting that the instinctive mistrust of government intervention in the
marketplace is usually inspired by corruption or inefficiency in public monopolies. Because
VMRS ties the hands of government, admitting only a small bureaucracy to administer the
public's votes, it is relatively resistant to these modes of failure.
Having said this, it is clear that libertarians, who place an ethical concern for liberty
ahead of utilitarian concerns about the welfare of society, have reason to prefer completely noncoercive systems of cultural production, such as the “street performer protocol” and its
variants261 to either virtual markets or exclusive rights.
Artists would be in a terrible position if they depended on a government for their income
— this objection seems at first to have some validity. A more cynical observer might also say,
however, that artists who depend on record companies, radio stations, or on the administrators of
DRM systems, may suffer from a similar problem. Whenever creative workers rely on some
form of infrastructure for their income, there is the possibility that the infrastructure will not
259
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meet their needs — or that the infrastructure itself will find some way of appropriating the value
of their work.
By making VMRS as transparent as possible, and by giving the public a great deal of say
in the scope and allocation of rewards, it would at least be possible to build a system which
guaranteed artists a fair return for their work. In a digital context, it is not clear that any other
scheme can reliably achieve this.
A virtual market would just be one more step towards an Orwellian state in which all of
our actions are monitored and controlled — as it turns out, this is not really a particular problem
of VMRS. Even if the very strong steps I suggested above262 were not taken, virtual markets
would do little to decrease online privacy. Law enforcement agencies already have access to
much more revealing information through sources such as “Carnivore” devices at ISPs,263 or
through the monitoring of email traffic at the Internet backbone. Carnivore, for example, gives
the U.S. government knowledge about when individual Americans browse the web, what they
have read and what they have searched for. Resourceful crackers are perfectly capable of turning
computers that they control into their own privatized equivalents of Carnivore.
It is true that knowledgeable Internet users can find ways around online surveillance —
software such as GnuPG264 or PGP265, and services such as Hushmail266, can provide secure
email systems; anonymizing proxies allow (limited) browsing privacy.267 But maintaining one's
digital privacy is a difficult activity which few people are motivated to pursue. These are the
only individuals who would be threatened with privacy invasion by VMRS.
It is also important to realize that any information disclosed through a VMRS must be
given away willingly — if, for whatever reason, one does not wish to have one's tastes known,
one could use alternative (underground or offline) channels to obtain content.
The reason for choosing to use the virtual market is that it actually provides something
extra — an income for the authors and artists one appreciates, and thus, more works to be
enjoyed. VMRS is in a sense a very anti-Orwellian application of technology, because it allows
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ordinary people more say in the world around them, rather than less.
VMRS reduces the number of choices creators have for the distribution of their work —
this is a valid concern which results from the issue of blanket licenses for a VMRS system.
Whereas authors currently have the choice of different publishers, or the option of selfpublishing online,268 under a VMRS, the system sets the default conditions under which digital
material is distributed. While the virtual market would provide authors with an important,
sustainable (and previously unattainable) alternative, a restriction of other options is a legitimate
cause for concern.
The natural solution, is, of course, to give the author the opportunity to object and
exclude their work from the VMRS system. This may or may not be a net positive policy during
the initial bootstrapping of a virtual market, where an expansive catalogue would be necessary to
encourage public participation, and skepticism amongst publishing interests would be highest.
But if a stable and popular alternative compensation system can be created, these issues might be
much less pressing, and creators could enjoy the right to “opt-out” if they regarded a virtual
market as problematic for some reason.

B. Epilogue: Towards Information Democracy?
“What to do about digital copyright” can — without exaggeration — be characterized as
the most important policy question ensuing for the advent of networked digital computers.
As this article has endeavored to demonstrate, there are real alternatives to the present
course of attempting to implant copyright into the digital world. Communications and
computation gadgetry surrounds us, now, but we have only begun to learn how to use it as
individuals. It is entirely possible that, applied correctly, these technologies could make new
forms of economic organization both feasible and efficient. This article is just one attempt to
guess at what some of those forms might be.
Whether or not the “virtual market” is the right way forward, it seems that wise societies
should be searching for ways to ensure that technology grants their citizens greater access to art,
knowledge and learning, greater opportunities for creativity and collaboration, and greater
sovereignty over the world around them. This, perhaps, is an ideal of “information democracy”
which lies between the extremes of “information anarchism” and “feudalism”.
The challenge is one of inertia. The metaphor of physical property, in its application to
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books, sheet music, vinyl records and video tapes, may have done us more good than harm. But
it would be an irresponsibility of the highest order if that increasingly stretched and ill-fitting
metaphor were allowed to preempt serious consideration of how future societies will define the
relationship of their authors, artists and publishers with their citizens.
Readers with the professional habit of reasoning in the logic of copyright law will no
doubt perceive some of the notions proposed in this article as radical departures from established
institutions. This perspective however, is inherently susceptible to underestimation of the degree
to which “digital rights management” is in turn a radical imposition on the natural logic of the
computer. In this matter, it seems, we are all radicals. Given the weight and novelty of the issues
at work, we should choose our stripes carefully.
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